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Abstract 
This dissertation focuses on renewable energy policy in the US and demand-side management in 
US regional electricity markets. Considering the existing state and the federal policies that 
promote renewable electricity generation, the analyses in this dissertation seek to explain the 
impact of those policies on investment in renewable energy technologies as well as the impact of 
more renewable generation on the markets and electricity consumers’ behavior. This dissertation 
consists of three essays employing optimization and empirical analysis techniques to examine the 
relationships among renewable electricity generation, electricity demand and policy. 
The first essay in this dissertation provides an understanding of the impact of 
uncertainties about renewable energy policy on wind energy investments. It considers the 
uncertainty about future state and federal policies that subsidize wind projects and how this 
uncertainty affects decisions to invest in wind energy. A real-options theory is employed to model 
the investment decisions of a firm to understand how irreversible investment in wind energy 
depends on federal subsidy uncertainties (the Production Tax Credit, or PTC) and price 
uncertainty in renewable energy markets. Results contribute to our understanding of the impact of 
the federal and state policy decisions on the profitability threshold to commit to a renewable 
energy investment. One of the major findings is that the uncertainty about the federal PTC policy 
lowers the profitability threshold to invest in wind energy and stimulates wind installations. The 
PTC incentive matters to investors in wind projects, and permanently removing the federal PTC 
policy may reduce future investment projects in the US.  On the other hand, more stringent state 
RPS policies that would increase the demand for Renewable Electricity Credits (RECs) would 
tend to encourage wind investment. 
The second essay examines consumers’ response to electricity price changes in the retail 
and wholesale markets in the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) and it provides 
  iv 
a comparison between the retail electricity market, in which industrial consumers do not observe 
real-time price changes and pay a pre-determined flat rate, and the wholesale electricity market, 
in which consumers are able to change their electricity consumption based on real-time price 
changes. I estimate the demand for electricity by industrial customers using a two-stage model. 
Results show that industrial price elasticities in retail markets vary across states in the Midwest. 
Price elasticity estimates show that consumers in the wholesale market are less responsive to 
price changes than are consumers in the retail market.   
The third essay provides an assessment of residential solar PV penetration and its 
implications for future electricity demand in the US. More specifically, this essay addresses the 
question of how rooftop solar penetration affects the residential electricity demand and how 
residential PV penetration affects electricity sales. Further, it examines the impact of the state 
policies (i.e., state Net Energy Metering policy, state regulatory status) on residential PV capacity 
additions. Results of the empirical analysis show that state policies promote adoption of rooftop 
solar in the residential sector. This causes a significant reduction in residential electricity demand 
from electric utility companies. Ultimately, results show that residential customers become more 
responsive to price changes with more solar electricity generation. States with higher scores for 
their encouragement of solar energy will see more dramatic reductions in utility sales to 
residential consumers.  
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1. Introduction  
 
The United States electric power sector has a sophisticated infrastructure that has been going 
through an important transition over the past two decades. This transition includes considerable 
growth in the integration of renewable technologies into the electric power system and 
improvements in the adoption of the energy efficiency and load management technologies. Total 
renewable electricity generation has increased by 40% between 2008 and 2013, installed 
renewable capacity has approximately doubled and the share of the total renewable electricity 
production in the US became approximately 11% of the total generation portfolio in 2013 (NREL 
2013). On the electricity consumption side, electricity consumers have become smarter in 
consuming electricity. Large consumers have increased their investments in load management 
technologies and they are more able to participate in demand response programs.  They can both 
reduce their consumption of electricity and shift consumption to off-peak times of the day. 
Residential customers have increased the number of distributed generation sources (e.g., 
consumer-owned rooftop solar). Overall, the growth in demand for electricity has declined over 
the past two decades (EIA, 2014).  
Rules governing electricity generation and distribution are as complex as the 
infrastructure and are governed by federal, state and local entities. State and federal policies have 
changed dramatically in recent years, and these changes have played and important in changing 
the market structure and the economics of electric power in the United States. As one example, 
participants in the electricity generation side of the market have become more motivated to invest 
in cleaner and more efficient energy technologies with the support of federal and state incentives 
for renewable energy and energy efficiency. 
This dissertation considers four leading policies that have influenced this transition of the 
US power markets: (1) the federal Production Tax Credits (PTC) policy, (2) the state Renewable 
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Portfolio Standards and the associated Renewable Electricity Credits market for wind; (3) the 
state Net Energy Metering Policy for solar and (4) retail competition for the implementation of 
demand response. Considering these policies and regulations, the essays in this dissertation aim to 
address research questions related to renewable electricity generation and electricity demand 
management in specific sectors and specific electricity regions in the US. This dissertation 
focuses specifically on electricity generation from wind and solar because renewable electricity 
generation from commercial wind and residential solar have shown substantial growth in the past 
decade. These renewable resources have benefited the most from the federal and state policies 
and economic incentives. In the consideration of demand response programs, the focus is 
particularly on industrial customers as large electricity users because large electricity users play 
an important role in the demand response programs of the Midcontinent Independent System 
Operator (MISO) region. 
1.1 Dissertation Objectives  
 
The goal of this dissertation is to provide an understanding of selected relationships between the 
economics of clean energy and policy. This dissertation also aims to provide a better 
understanding of the implementation of demand response resources in retail and wholesale 
markets of the Midwest region.  
The first chapter provides an economic analysis of the investment decision in renewable 
energy, wind in particular, using a real-options framework. It provides an understanding of the 
impact of uncertainty about the renewable energy policy on this investment decision by finding a 
profitability threshold for investment. This chapter focuses explicitly on the uncertainty about the 
federal Production Tax Credits (PTC) policy and future Renewable Electricity Credits (RECs) 
market prices. The chapter develops and analyzes a model of a potential wind turbine investor’s 
decision to invest in the face of such policy uncertainties.  
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The second chapter looks at the demand side of the electricity market and investigates 
whether industrial customers in the MISO region could serve as a demand response resource 
through utility-monitored dynamic pricing programs in MISO electricity markets. It considers 
whether regional retail competition, allowing customers to choose the lowest rate offering 
electricity provider, is likely to influence the adoption of demand response. This chapter provides 
an econometric analysis of the responsiveness of the industrial customers to the electricity price 
changes and the variation in this price-responsiveness across the states of MISO retail electricity 
market. Further, the empirical analysis in this chapter quantifies the MISO market response to the 
real-time price changes.  
The third chapter provides an empirical analysis of the residential electricity demand 
considering the increasing distributed solar generation capacity in the United States. The focus of 
this chapter is the impacts of this increased distributed generation on utilities. While estimating 
the residential demand, the analysis in this chapter also quantifies customer responsiveness to 
electricity price changes with more residential rooftop solar installations.  
The essays in this dissertation will contribute to the understanding of the economics of clean 
energy generation, markets and policy through the following research questions.  
 How does uncertainty about the continuation of the Production Tax Credit subsidy and 
REC prices affect the decision to invest in wind energy?  
 How do these sources of policy uncertainty interact and affect the investment threshold 
for wind energy in regional REC markets? 
 How do consumers respond to electricity price changes in retail and wholesale markets 
in the MISO footprint?  
 How does price-responsiveness change with the increasing capacity installations of 
distributed generation technologies?  
 What is the impact of retail competition on demand response adoption?  
 Does retail customer price-responsiveness have similarities with wholesale customer 
price-responsiveness?   
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Chapter 1 
Uncertainty in Renewable Energy Policy in the United States and 
Decision on Investment in Wind 
1.1 Introduction  
 
Renewable energy resources have significant potential to supply energy, support energy security 
goals, and contribute to less carbon-intensive energy production. The United States, one of the 
largest electricity consumers in the world (EIA, 2012), has been successful in increasing the share 
of electricity produced from renewable sources. Electricity generation from non-hydro renewable 
resources is projected to grow by 3.7% in 2014, and wind is expected to contribute about 5% of 
total electricity generation in 2015 (EIA, 2014). In 2012, the largest share of US electricity 
generation capacity additions was coming from wind (EIA, 2012). This significant increase in 
renewable energy investments can be attributed, in part, to supportive government policies at both 
state and federal levels (Martinot et al., 2005).  
Despite supportive federal and state policies, electricity production from renewables is 
still only a small fraction of the total energy supply in the United States. There are several 
possible reasons. First, renewable energy may simply not be cost-competitive with energy from 
non-renewable sources given current technology and prices. Even when renewable energy is 
economically feasible, it takes time to develop the underlying infrastructure. Second, 
uncertainties about future prices and technology may dampen current investments even though 
investment in renewable resources would be wise if current prices and technology were sure to 
persist into the future. Third, if most of the incentives to invest in renewable energy come from 
government policy, investors may be concerned that these incentives may not last. This essay 
focuses on the third reason and asks how uncertainty in renewable energy policy affects 
investment decisions in the United States.  
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Wind has been the renewable energy resource that has benefited the most from state and 
federal policies (Wiser et al., 2007); wind capacity has been the fastest growing renewable energy 
source in the US (EIA, 2012). National cumulative wind energy capacity has significantly 
increased (from 894 MW to more than 60,000 MW) between 1992 and 2013 (Lou, 2011; EIA, 
2012, Brown, 2012; AWEA, 2013). In addition to the wind resource availability and spatial cost-
effectiveness of renewable energy generation (Green Power Network 2013), investment in wind 
energy is also attractive when state and federal policies incentivize the investors who bear the 
considerable irreversible investment costs.  
The federal government has promoted renewable energy through Production Tax Credits 
(PTC) since the passage of the Energy Policy Act in 1992. These credits are tax benefits received 
for production of renewable energy from biomass, wind, hydro, geothermal or solid waste. For 
example, investment in wind power is currently subsidized at $23 per megawatt-hour during the 
first ten years of a new renewable energy facility's operation, which covers almost one-third of 
the initial installation cost (Brown, 2012). Congress has repeatedly renewed these credits each 
time they were set to expire. Most recently, the PTC was set to expire on December 2013 and 
projects that were installed before January 1, 2014 continue to receive these credits. However, it 
is still unclear whether the PTC incentive will be available for future wind projects (Barradale, 
2010; Brown, 2012). Wind developers are concerned that the permanent expiration of the PTC 
will have a significant impact on the industry, jobs and economic output from wind (Lantz et al., 
2014). Thus, the impact of the uncertainty about the PTC incentive on future investment decisions 
in wind energy is unclear. Figure 1.1 shows the cumulative and quarterly increase in wind 
capacity installations between 2008 and the first quarter of 2014. Although the cumulative wind 
capacity installations have substantially increased since the first quarter of 2008, several on-and-
off periods in the PTC policy created volatility in the quarterly capacity installations. Especially 
during the times when the federal government allowed PTCs to expire or when they were late in 
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extending the PTC policy, capacity installations were approximately 70-92% lower nationally. 
Figure 1 clearly shows the significant drop in the capacity installation in the first quarter of 2013 
after the federal government allowed the PTC to expire at the end of the last quarter of 2012. A 
study by Barradale (2010) also confirms that wind investments were considerably lower during 
the period of uncertainty about the future of the PTC incentive. Further, the EIA reported that 
approximately 40% of the wind capacity installations became available just before the expiration 
of the PTC in the last quarter of 2012 (EIA, 2012). 
 
Figure 1. 1: Wind Capacity Installations between 2008 and 2014 
Individual states have instituted Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) programs in which 
a certain fraction of total electricity must be produced using renewable sources. Applications of 
Renewable Portfolio Standards vary from state to state depending on the policy objectives such as 
reducing carbon emissions, promoting new investment in renewable energy, creating green jobs 
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or innovating cleaner technology (Heeter et al., 2011). Renewable Portfolio Standard programs 
are implemented with Renewable Electricity Credits (RECs), tradable commodities used to 
facilitate compliance with the renewable energy requirements provided by the RPS. RECs are 
earned by producing electricity from renewable sources as an attribute of the generated renewable 
electricity, and excess credits can be sold to firms that fall short in meeting RPS requirements. 
RECs have been one of the fundamental drivers of successful private wind projects and have 
provided additional revenue for the producers (Cory et al. 2008). 
REC prices are determined in regional trading markets and, usually, 1 REC is equivalent 
to 1MWh of electricity generated from wind. Based on the differences in the resource availability 
(e.g., wind speed) and the compliance market requirements, REC prices may differ by region 
(Cory et al., 2008; US DOE, 2013). Voluntary markets allow trading in green energy within and 
across the states that do not have RPS or that have already reached RPS goals (Heeter and Bird, 
2011). Both the compliance and voluntary markets for RECs foster development of wind projects 
and provide additional revenue for these projects (Brown, 2012).  
While state and federal policies continue to incentivize wind projects, a recent wind 
market assessment by the U.S. Department of Energy shows that relying only on current state 
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) will not be sufficient to meet future wind development 
targets (Lu et al., 2011; Wiser et al., 2012). They find that supplementing the states’ RPS 
programs with a federal PTC program supports increased wind investments. On the other hand, 
another market assessment by Dismukes (2012) argues that the PTC policy is inefficient, creating 
negative prices for wind, and that current state RPS requirement are sufficient to meet renewable 
energy targets. Therefore, future of the PTC policy is a contemporary debate in Congress as well 
as among researchers (Barradale, 2010).  
I use real options theory (Arrow and Fischer, 1974; Pindyck, 1980, 1984, 1988, 2000, 
Dixit and Pindyck, 1993), which focuses on problems related to investment when the decision to 
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invest is irreversible, to model the wind power investment decision under policy uncertainty. A 
few recent studies used this framework to examine investments in renewable energy considering 
various sources of market and policy uncertainty: uncertainty in future carbon prices and climate 
policy (Fuss, 2008, 2012), future fuel prices (Fuss et al., 2010; Lou, 2011), future pollution costs 
and pollution stock (Balikcioglu and Fackler, 2011), and future renewable and non-renewable 
resource stocks (Mosino, 2012). A recent study by Reuter et al. (2012) looked at investment 
decisions in wind energy under uncertain climate policy in Germany using real-options 
framework. Their findings showed that the policy and market uncertainties make higher level of 
incentives necessary for energy companies to commit to an irreversible investment such as wind 
(Reuter et al. 2012). In this essay, I build upon this theoretical framework and previous work to 
investigate the impact of uncertainty about federal renewable energy policy and stochastic 
Renewable Electricity Credits (REC) prices on renewable energy investment decisions. Research 
questions include: (1) how does uncertainty about the continuation of the Production Tax Credit 
subsidy affect the decision to invest in wind energy; (2) how do uncertain REC prices affect the 
decision to invest in wind energy; and (3) how do these two sources of uncertainty interact and 
affect investment threshold in wind energy in regional REC markets? This essay studies the 
uncertainty around the two important renewable energy policies that drive wind investments in 
the US and contributes to an understanding of wind investment thresholds of private power 
generating companies given uncertainty about future renewable energy policy. It provides an 
understanding of how these policy incentives influence the investment profitability threshold in 
different REC trading regions, where the REC market volatility and average prices vary.   
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1.2 Methods 
 
I model the decision to invest in renewable electricity using a discrete-choice dynamic 
optimization problem. The decision to invest in renewable electricity production from wind 
energy is considered to be irreversible. I assume that the representative investor is a price taker 
and that the capacity of the wind turbine model is not large enough to affect electricity or REC 
prices. The investor knows the current REC and electricity price and knows that the RPS goals 
need to be met by 2034 (Wiser et al., 2012). I assume that the investor faces fluctuating REC 
prices and electricity prices could be high, average or low1. I assume two policy uncertainties in 
the model: (1) annual prices of Renewable Electricity Credits (RECs) follow a stochastic process, 
and (2) the federal government may or may not choose to continue the PTC incentive when it 
expires at the end of each year. I solve the model over a 20-year time horizon (T = 20) because I 
expect that the renewable energy goals will be met by 2034. I assume that expected REC prices 
will settle into their long-term average values by the end of the time horizon because states will 
meet their RPS requirements and the supply of wind energy will be stabilized. Also, the Power 
Purchase Agreements (PPA) for private wind projects usually last for 20 years (Cory et al., 2008). 
Finally, the representative investor sells RECs for each unit of renewable energy produced from 
wind and it is assumed that 1REC=1MWh.            
1.2.1 Optimization Model Framework 
In the model, the representative investor maximizes the expected profits from producing wind 
energy. In each period, the investor can take two possible actions: invest in the renewable 
electricity production (𝑥𝑡 = 1), or not (𝑥𝑡 = 0), preserving the option to invest in future periods. 
The investor starts with the state variable 𝑠𝑡 = 0, where the investment has not yet taken place. If 
the investor decides to invest in renewable electricity at time t (xt = 1), he bears the sunk cost of 
                                                 
1 I include electricity prices as deterministic categorical (high, average, low) variable to improve the 
computational efficiency. In the future work, I will allow for more fluctuation in electricity prices.   
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investment(CSUNK) at that time. If the Production Tax Credit is in place (αt = 1), the investor 
receives the federal subsidy (τ) for each unit of electricity generated (N) from the wind turbine 
every year (PTCt= τ ∙ N). Energy production starts one year after investment, and then the 
investor receives revenue from electricity production (pe ∙ N where pe is the electricity price and 
N is the amount of electricity produced) and from RECs (Rt) sold in the market for Renewable 
Electricity Credits at price qt. Because electric grid may not always be able to handle excess 
power, I assume a curtailment rate for both the electricity and the RECs generated from a single 
wind turbine and sold to the grid. Further, wind turbines usually do not operate at their full 
capacity due to the intermittent nature of wind. I assume a capacity factor to adjust for the 
efficiency of the wind turbine. The investor pays constant operating and maintenance costs 
annually (C).  
I assume that the investor has only one irreversible option to invest: xt and st cannot both 
take the value of 1 in the same time period. The optimization problem of the representative 
investor is thus formulated as follows:  
maxxtE ∑
1
(1 + r)t
[π(xt;  st, qt, p
e, αt)]
T=20
t=0
                              (1.1) 
subject to 
π(xt;  st, qt, p
e, αt) = st. [(p
e ∙ N + qt. Rt) ∙ θ − C] + xt[αt ∙ PTCt − C
SUNK]   
VT+1(sT+1,αT+1, p
e, qT+1) =
1
(1 + r)
sT+1. ((p
e ∗ N + qT+1 ∗ RT+1) ∙ θ − C)   
st+1 = st + xt 
qt+1 = f(qt, εt+1)  
st + xt ≤ 1  
           xt ∈ (0,1)          
          st ∈ (0,1)          
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  αt ∈ (0,1) 
The expected benefits from investment depend on expected REC prices, expected federal 
PTC incentive and the electricity price. The terminal value received at time T+1 
(VT+1(sT+1, αT+1, qT+1, p
e)) is the present value of the stream of revenues from RECs and 
electricity at the prices in place at time T+1. Optimal investment decisions can be derived by 
recursively solving Bellman's equation: 
Vt(st, αt, qt) = max
xt
[π(xt; st, αt, qt, p
e) + βE(Vt+1(st+1,αt+1, qt+1, p
e|xt))]                 (1.2) 
The investor chooses the optimal decision in a particular stage at each possible state by 
maximizing the value of the investment at any time of the horizon. I use the COMPECON 
toolbox solver by Miranda and Fackler (2002) to solve this optimization problem. I use data on 
prices, government policy, and engineering specifications to specify the parameters of the 
optimization model, as outlined below. An investment decision in such large and expensive 
projects requires a detailed feasibility analysis. Therefore, we use a year as the time step, 
assuming that the investor makes a decision to invest annually.  
1.2.2 Model Parameters 
I use several data sources to obtain model parameters. First, I base the analytical model on a land-
based wind turbine from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) as a reference wind 
turbine project2. The representative wind turbine has 1.5MW power capacity providing about 
4,862MWh/year per turbine in energy, which is approximately equivalent to the annual electricity 
consumption of about 500 residential homes per year (NREL, 2011; DOE, 2013). The initial sunk 
cost of investment for this particular wind turbine is about $2.1 million/MW. Operating and 
maintenance costs (O&M) constitute about 25% of the initial investment cost or 
                                                 
2 Reference wind turbine project is a national assessment projects the levelized cost of wind energy in the 
US (Tegen et al., 2013). 
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$52,500/year/turbine, and O&M for wind turbines are generally fixed over a year period (NREL 
2011); O&M costs are assumed constant in the model.  Annual energy produced from the wind 
turbine is calculated as the amount of energy produced from a 1.5MW capacity wind turbine 
adjusted by the annual capacity factor. We assume 5% curtailment and a 37% capacity factor. 
The annual discount factor is 8%, and there are 8760 hours in year. Table 1.1 summarizes the 
parameters used in the model.  
Table 1. 1: Model Parameters, Notation and Data Sources 
Parameter Name  Notation  Value  Data Sources  
Wind Turbine Capacity 
(MW/year/turbine) 
M 1.5 EIA 2012 
Annual Energy Production 
(MWh/year/turbine) 
N 4,862 
(M ∗ k ∗ 24) 
NREL 2011 
Amount of RECs Generated  Rt 4,862 DOE 2012  
Curtailment Rate Θ 0.05 Assumed 
Sunk Cost of Wind Turbine 
($/MW/turbine) 
CSUNK 2,098,000 NREL 2011 
Annual O&M Cost for Wind 
Turbine ($/MW/year/turbine) 
C 52,500 
(1.5*35,000) 
NREL 2011 
Federal PTC Incentive 
($/MWh) 
Τ 23 DSIRE 2012 
Capacity Factor (%) k 37% NREL 2011 
Probability of Keeping the 
PTC Policy 
P 0.7  Wiser 2007, Lou 2011 
and Brown 2012 
Discount Factor  Β 0.08 NREL 2011 
Total Hours in a Year h 8760 hrs. 24*365 
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1.2.3 Modeling Prices and Uncertain PTC Policy 
1.2.3.1. Uncertainty in the Production Tax Credits (PTC) Policy 
One of the stochastic components in the model is the federal PTC policy. Revenues from the PTC 
are included in the model at the time of investment. If the PTC policy is in place at the time the 
investor decides to install a wind turbine, the investor receives $23MWh (τ) per unit of renewable 
energy production (N) for the next ten years of energy production.  By investing at any time t 
when the PTC is in place (αt = 1), the investor locks in a stream of payments worth PTCt = τ ∗
N each year for 10 years. If the PTC policy is not in place (αt = 0) at the time the investor 
decides to invest, then he will not receive any payments at time t: PTCt = 0. I keep track of the 
investment decision at each time step and make sure that the PTC incentive is paid for only next 
10 years after the investment decision if the investor were eligible to receive these credits before 
the PTC is removed in the next period. 
PTCt = {
∑
1
(1+r)t+i
(τ ∙ N)10i , αt = 1
0, αt = 0
                                              (1.3) 
The investor knows whether or not the PTC policy will be continued or discontinued with 
some probability, and these probabilities are independent across time intervals. To date, the 
government has continued the PTC policy. However, the PTC policy has an expiration date, and, 
as discussed earlier, the decision to extend it has often been the subject of contentious debate in 
Congress. Continuation of the PTC policy is therefore introduced in the model as a binary random 
variable{𝛼𝑡}𝑡≥1. More specifically, the PTC for wind expired in 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2012, and 
2013 (Wiser, 2007; Lou, 2011; Brown, 2012). With the exception of year 2013, the federal 
government extended these credits after expiration. Consistent with the legislative history of the 
federal government’s decisions, I have assumed that the probability of the federal government 
continuing the PTC policy is higher than the probability of the federal government allowing the 
policy to lapse. Thus, the probability of the federal government maintaining the PTC policy is 
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assumed to be 70% (p) in the next time period whereas the probability of the federal government 
removing the PTC policy is assumed to be 30% (1- p). I also test the sensitivity of the results to 
different probabilities on the continuation of the PTC in the Results section. If the federal 
government removes the PTC policy, I assume that there is no chance that the PTC policy can be 
enacted again. This assumption is based on the shortened historical effective duration of the PTC 
policy. Renewable market projections on the PTC policy show these credits phasing out from the 
renewable industry (Wiser, 2007; Sherman, 2013). Similarly, there are studies showing that the 
PTC is no longer a cost effective policy (Palmer et al., 2005; Fell et al., 2012). 
    Prob(αt+1|αt) = {
p                      if αt = 1, αt+1 = 1
1 − p             if αt = 1, αt+1 = 0
1                     if αt = 0, αt+1 = 0
0                      if αt = 0, αt+1 = 1
                                             (1.4)     
1.2.3.2 REC Prices 
REC prices (𝑞𝑡), follow a Markov process in the model; future REC prices are a function only of 
current prices and a stochastic error term. I assume a commonly used mean reverting process for 
REC prices: 
qt = δ(μ − qt−1)  + σεt                                                                   (1.5) 
where 𝛿 is the mean reversion rate, 𝜇 is the average REC price, 𝜎 is the constant volatility and 𝜀𝑡  
is the normally distributed i.i.d. stochastic term. I estimate  𝑞𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑞𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡   using Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS), and calculate the parameters in Equation (1.5) (Dixit and Pindyck, 1993): 
𝛿 = − ln(𝑎) , 𝜇𝑖 =
𝑏
1 − 𝑎
, 𝜎 = 𝑠𝑑(𝜀)
√−2 ln(𝑎)
√(1 − 𝑎)2
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This mean reverting process fits the historical REC price data3. Table 2 shows the 
parameter calculations for the mean reversion model based on the OLS estimation. I use these 
parameters to simulate many REC price paths and generate the transition probability matrix from 
these simulated price paths.   
REC markets are structured regionally because states have different RPS requirements to 
meet and RECs are delivered to regional REC markets (Heeter and Bird, 2012). There are various 
factors that influence regional REC markets: availability of the renewable energy sources, 
demand for RECs, and stringency of the RPS policies (Heeter and Bird, 2012; Green Power 
Network, 2013). Therefore, I consider the location-specific characteristics of RECs as well, and 
simulate REC prices for two different REC trading regions in the country: NEPOOL and PJM4, 
considering the differences in volatility, mean-reversion rate and long-term mean. In Figure 1.2, I 
present the daily historical REC prices for these regions between 2006 and 20145. A visual 
inspection of the historical spot prices in Figure 2 shows that PJM ($8/MWh) has lower average 
prices compared to NEPOOL ($23/MWh). Also, REC prices in NEPOOL are more volatile 
compared to the PJM market. Figure 2 only includes compliance RECs. Solar RECs and 
voluntary RECs are excluded from the series in order to consider only the required RECs traded 
in the market. In Figure 1.3, I include a histogram of the simulated REC price paths after 
calibrating the estimated model parameters for the overall REC market statistics. Also, I present 
the parameters for the mean reverting REC price process for these two REC trading regions in 
Table 1.2. 
  
                                                 
3 OLS regression outputs for two different models and the OLS model fit are provided in the Appendix 
Table 1.1 and Figure 1.1.  
4 REC Market regions includes states:  
NEPOOL: NH, ME, CT, VT 
PJM: DE, IL, IN, KY, MY, MI, NJ, NC, OH, PA, TN, VI, DC 
5 The REC market data is obtained from Marex Spectron and it includes daily bid and offer for each REC 
(e.g., SRECs, Wind RECs). I present the mid-point value of the bid and offer values.  
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 Figure 1. 2: Regional Historical Spot REC Prices in NEPOOL and PJM 
 
 
 
Figure 1. 3: Histogram for Simulated REC Price Paths 
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Table 1. 2: Parameter Calculations for Simulated REC Price Paths 
Parameter PJM NEPOOL 
Mean Reversion (δ) 0.5310 0.9784 
Average Price (μ) $7.4/MWh $21.8/MWh 
Constant Volatility (σ) 2.89 9.5 
 
1.2.3.3 Electricity Prices  
Electricity price statistics are similar for PJM and New England between 2006 and 2014, where 
the average electricity prices range between $60/MWh and $62/MWh both for PJM and 
NEPOOL. Similar to the REC market prices, the average electricity price is higher in the 
Northeast, where the monthly average electricity price reached up to $131/MWh between 2006 
and 2014. I categorize the electricity prices as high (H), average (A) and low (L) based on the 
summary statistics in Table 1.3. For example, in PJM, the low electricity price is $33/MWh; the 
average electricity price is $60/MWh and the high electricity price range is $130/MWh. In New 
England, the low electricity price is $34/MWh; the average electricity price is $64/MWh and the 
high electricity price range is $131/MWh 
Table 1. 3: Summary Statistics for Regional Electricity Prices 
Parameter Min Mean  Max Std.Dev 
PJM ($/MWh) 33 60 130 19.09 
New England $/MWh) 34 64 131 20.37 
1.3 Results  
 
The solution of this investment problem involves finding the REC price threshold that determines 
an investment decision. The decision to invest depends on whether REC prices reach the 
threshold for the given time period, whether the PTC policy is in force, and the level of the 
electricity price. The threshold for investment divides the space into two regions.  Above the 
boundary is the price at which an investor will choose to invest; below this price, an investor will 
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choose not to invest. Also, the investment threshold represents the critical minimum REC price 
that the investor will commit to the investment in wind turbine. The critical REC prices for 
investment are within the range of $15/MWh and $30/MWh with the PTC policy and within the 
range of $30MWh and $85/MWh without the PTC policy. Figure 1.4 shows the investment 
threshold with and without the PTC policy with average electricity prices.  
 
Figure 1. 4: REC Price Threshold with and without the PTC Policy 
 
The REC price threshold depends on time and it decreases as the end of the horizon 
approaches. The level of decrease in the REC threshold over time depends on whether the PTC 
policy is in force or not and the volatility of REC prices. The investor requires a higher price 
earlier in the horizon because of the greater possibility of lower future prices (i.e., higher REC 
prices reverting to their mean) with uncertain REC prices.  With the PTC policy, the investor 
requires lower REC prices to invest. Without the PTC policy, REC threshold is higher than the 
threshold with the PTC policy. The reason for this is that the investor receives the PTC, which 
covers about one-third of the initial investment cost; receiving these tax credits substantially 
lowers the cost of investment (Linn and Richardson, 2013). Moreover, the investment threshold 
also has a wider range when there is no PTC: the threshold starts from $85/MWh and drops to 
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$30/MWh. However, the investment threshold starts from $30/MWh and drops to $15/MWh 
when the investor receives the tax credits. This shows that the investor invests at higher REC 
prices in earlier time periods to recover the investment costs without the PTC policy but he would 
commit to the investment at lower REC prices towards the end of the horizon. The investor is 
willing to invest at lower REC prices as the end of the horizon approaches because there is no 
longer substantial uncertainty about REC prices dropping towards the end of the horizon.  
We also find that, with high electricity prices, the investment threshold decreases.  This 
suggests that higher electricity prices stimulate investments even when REC prices are low. 
Further, with higher electricity prices and with the PTC, we find that the minimum REC price for 
investment is the lowest compared to the other cases. Conversely, with lower electricity prices, 
we find higher minimum REC threshold for investment. In fact, consistent with the initial results, 
the threshold is higher when there is no PTC policy regardless of the level of electricity prices. 
Interestingly, the minimum investment threshold is considerably lower with high electricity prices 
even when there is no PTC policy. This suggests that the electricity prices may be the primary 
driver of wind investments without the PTC policy. In other words, the investor does not require 
as high REC prices to invest without the government subsidy if the electricity prices are 
sufficiently high. In Table 1.4, we provide the simulation results for low, average and high 
electricity prices considering the cases with and without the PTC policy.  
Table 1. 4: REC Threshold at t=1 
 Low Average High 
With the PTC Policy $32.5/MWh $30/MWh $25/MWh 
Without the PTC Policy  $98/MWh $85/MWh $35/MWh 
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Finally, our results show that, with stochastic REC prices and the uncertain decision of 
the federal government about the PTC policy, the investor's decision to invest is affected by 
policy uncertainties. Because of the lack of information about the federal PTC policy and the 
possibility of volatile REC prices in the future, the investor has an incentive to invest before 
missing the chance to receive the PTC.  
1.3.1 Regional REC Thresholds for Investment  
Solutions in PJM and NEPOOL also show that the REC threshold is always lower with the PTC 
policy than it is without the PTC policy. However, investment decisions may vary across regions 
based on differences in REC market characteristics (e.g., volatility, average price, mean reversion 
parameter). Solving the investor’s problem for the two regions with the calibrated values, I find 
differences in the REC price threshold among the regional REC markets. Without the PTC policy, 
this wind project would not be built in PJM and NEPOOL at current REC and average electricity 
prices. However, with the PTC policy, the investor in PJM, where there is relatively lower 
average REC market price and more volatility, requires a higher critical REC price threshold. The 
simulations results for PJM and NEPOOL include average electricity prices. Table 1.5 provides 
the range for REC price thresholds for PJM and NEPOOL regions with and without the PTC 
policy.  
Table 1. 5: Simulations for Different REC Trading Regions 
Regions PJM NEPOOL 
With the PTC $0-$72 $0-$23 
Without the PTC Not invest Not invest 
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1.3.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
The analytical model is sensitive to the level of uncertainty about the government’s decision on 
the PTC policy. In the initial simulations, I calibrated the probability of the government’s 
decision to continue the PTC policy as 0.7 and the probability of the government’s decision to 
remove the PTC policy as 0.3 (baseline scenario). With a higher probability (p = 0.9) of 
continuation of the PTC policy, the REC threshold increases.  If the probability of keeping the 
PTC policy is higher, it is not as critical for an investor to invest now rather than later. The 
investor would be able to invest at higher REC prices to maximize his profits at any time with the 
higher possibility of receiving the tax credits. When, however, the PTC policy is to be continued 
with substantially lower probability (p = 0.1) than the baseline scenario (p = 0.7), the minimum 
investment threshold decreases. When there is higher probability of not receiving the tax credits if 
the investment is made in the future, the investor is willing to invest at lower REC prices in order 
to obtain the PTC.  
I also perform a sensitivity analysis to identify the impact of changes in REC price 
parameters on the investment threshold. The model is sensitive to the mean reversion (𝛿) and 
constant volatility parameter (𝜎) of the stochastic REC price process.  I compare the REC price 
thresholds with higher and lower values of these parameters. With higher mean reversion rate and 
higher volatility in the REC market, the investment threshold increases. Table 1.6 summarizes the 
direction of change of the critical REC price threshold for different values of the parameters. 
Table 1. 6: Sensitivity Analysis: Direction of Change in REC Threshold 
 Higher 𝜹 Higher 𝝈 
With the PTC  Increase 
  
Increase  
Without the PTC  Decrease  Increase 
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1.4 Discussion and Policy Implications  
 
The purpose of this essay is to study the two important renewable energy policies in the US and 
to consider the effect of uncertainty on the investment threshold for a particular wind energy 
investment project. The findings of this analysis have important renewable energy policy 
implications. First, uncertainty about the future of state and federal renewable energy policy will 
influence investment decisions.  In particular, uncertainty about the future PTC policy is critical 
for investment decisions in wind energy. The PTC policy is a substantial incentive for wind 
investment projects in the US, and uncertainty in the PTC policy’s future will actually encourage 
current investment in wind. If there is a strong possibility that the PTC policy will expire, 
potential investors are prodded to take advantage of the policy while it is still in force. A large 
body of research supports that the federal PTC policy has an important role in making wind the 
top renewable resource to generate electricity in the US (Wiser et al., 2007; Lu et al., 2011). The 
wind manufacturing industry is concerned that the lack of a PTC would decrease the demand for 
wind installations and dampen economic output from wind deployment (Lantz et al., 2014).  
Another implicit effect of the future uncertainty in the PTC policy is that it may cause an 
accumulation of high wind generation capacity due to excess amount of wind investments before 
the federal policy expires. The practical implications of such stimulation of renewable energy 
earlier may not always be favorable. For example, wind technology may become more cost-
efficient in the next 20 years and a large amount of the incentive may be wasting resources for an 
already advanced cost-efficient technology (Reuter et al., 2012; Dismukes, 2012).  
In the absence of such a federal incentive in the future, state incentives will play a larger role for 
wind investment projects. Investors will require higher revenues from selling RECs in order to 
invest. REC market volatility will be a more important factor, as volatility tends to dampen the 
incentive to invest. Without the PTC policy, the incentive to invest in wind will depend on energy 
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prices, REC prices, and REC price volatility. If there are more stringent state RPS policies in the 
future, it may increase the demand for RECs and ultimately increase REC prices and renewable 
energy suppliers’ revenues. 
Regional market differences may also have different implications on investment 
decisions in wind energy. If the regional REC market prices are considerably lower (e.g., PJM) or 
the market is more volatile (e.g., NEPOOL), the federal government's decision to remove the 
PTC policy may dampen investments in renewable energy. In addition to the state RPS and 
federal PTC policies, regional electricity prices may influence the investment decisions. In 
regions with higher electricity prices, the investors may have an incentive to invest even though 
REC prices are very low. Moreover, states and Independent System Operators (ISOs) continue to 
promote renewable energy development and integration with other policies (Wiser et al. 2012). 
For example, the Texas Competitive Renewable Energy Zone (CREZ) program by ERCOT is 
projected to include 18,500MW of wind power by 2013 by expanding the transmission lines 
(Potomac Economics, 2012; Wiser et al. 2012). This has caused an excessive supply of RECs in 
ERCOT, which has caused lower average and more stable REC prices (Heeter and Bird, 2012). 
RECs from wind generation capacity have increased with the CREZ project from 3135 MW 
(ERCOT, 2006) to 12,776 MW (ERCOT, 2012) between 2006 and 2012. The large amount of 
wind investments in a short time in ERCOT generated a large supply of wind energy and lower 
REC market prices, which did not provide as much incentive relative to the other regions (Center 
for Energy Economics, 2009). Therefore, the uniform structure of the PTC policy should be 
considered carefully. There are examples of restructuring the government renewable energy 
incentives in Europe, in the context of a feed-in tariff, which is a fixed tariff paid for each unit of 
electricity from renewables (Reuter et al., 2012). Researchers have shown that a non-linear feed-
in-tariff could potentially save the government spending on the policy (Reuter et al., 2012). In 
addition, I assumed a particular technology in a particular location in this essay but market 
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conditions, installment costs and wind resource availability varies across the country and the 
uniform structure of PTC may create policy inefficiencies and fairness issues (Dismukes, 2012). 
Further, although the PTC provides renewable investments a great source of financial incentive, 
the federal PTC policy is costly to the society’s taxpayers compared to the state portfolio 
standards. Therefore, redesigning the PTC policy with variable rates based on the location, 
efficiency and capacity, and removing the uncertainties around the PTC policy would stimulate 
wind investments at the right time and in the right locations, where wind energy would actually 
contribute to the generation mix to provide cleaner electricity. 
In this essay, I do not specifically model whether it is better to remove or continue the 
PTC but I show that uncertainty has implications on the investment decision on wind energy and I 
suggest that a permanent government decision on the PTC policy would eliminate one of the 
uncertainties for the investors in these projects although removing uncertainty may dampen the 
investments in short-term.  
1.5 Conclusions 
 
This essay solves the problem of modeling a representative investor's decisions to invest in 
renewable energy over a 20-year time horizon. A discrete choice optimization model is employed 
for a price-taking investor who must decide about investing in a 1.5 MW capacity wind turbine. 
The analytical model includes two sources of uncertainty: 1) uncertainty about the federal 
government's decision to maintain the Production Tax Credits (PTC) policy, and 2) uncertainty 
about the Renewable Electricity Credits (REC) prices. I solve the model using dynamic 
programming, and I provide a minimum REC price threshold for the investment decision, which 
depends on the PTC policy and REC prices and decreases as the end of the time horizon 
approaches.  I find that the REC threshold is lower with the PTC policy. I also show that the 
investment decision is sensitive to the level of uncertainty about the PTC incentive and the REC 
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prices. A higher likelihood of continuation of the PTC policy increases the REC price threshold 
for investment in wind energy. This chapter contributes to an understanding of how the 
uncertainties in these policies will impact future wind investments over the next 20 years. 
As a concluding remark, solving this model for the U.S. wind industry would have important 
implications. An extension of this study would look at the impact of uncertainty in state and 
federal policy on wind energy investments in conjunction with the heterogeneity in wind turbines 
and employ empirical methods to demonstrate the impact of the uncertainty around the PTC on 
the historical investments in the US. Although the simulations are based on a particular land-
based wind turbine and sensitive to the calibrated parameter values, the model framework is 
applicable to different types of wind turbines (i.e., different capacity and cost levels) and other 
renewable energy sources with high initial investment costs, such as solar energy.  
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Chapter 2 
Price responsiveness in retail and wholesale markets: Implications for 
demand response in Midwest electricity markets 
2.1 Introduction  
 
While the wholesale price of electricity varies considerably across time of day and locations, 
electricity end-users usually pay a fixed retail-rate for their electricity. Relative to a situation in 
which end-users pay a retail price that tracks the wholesale price in real-time, paying a flat retail-
rate ensures end-users consume more electricity during peak hours when electricity is expensive 
to produce, and consume less during off-peak hours when electricity is cheaper to produce 
(Faruqui et al. 2009; Faruqui 2010). Demand response initiatives (e.g., time of use pricing, critical 
peak pricing, real-time pricing, interruptible load control) offer consumers an opportunity to 
reduce expenditures on electricity by shifting or reducing their electricity consumption in 
response to real-time price changes. Demand response also helps to smooth peak electricity prices 
by shifting low-value energy consumption behaviors to a time when electricity prices are 
correspondingly low and similarly, engaging in only high-value energy consuming activities at 
times of higher energy prices (Chao 2008; Alcott, 2009; Alcott, 2011; Cooke 2011). Demand 
response programs have been adopted across different electricity markets and Independent 
System Operators across the US. In 2013, demand response programs have contributed to 9.2% 
reduction in national peak demand, where 47% of the national peak reduction has come from 
industrial customers (FERC 2014). 
In traditionally regulated electricity markets, state public utilities commissions (PUCs) 
play an important role in regulating the electricity market, and state regulatory bodies determine 
rates. In a deregulated market, consumers can choose to purchase electricity from alternative 
retail electric suppliers and these suppliers can offer a variety of pricing mechanisms - making the 
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market environment more competitive (Nazarian 2012). With the exception of Illinois, Ohio and 
Michigan, states in the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) system are 
traditionally regulated. However, regionally, in the MISO footprint, electricity supply has 
recently been restructured. Electricity prices are determined in the wholesale market, while 
electricity distribution services and distribution rates are regulated by the state. Further, the MISO 
market reduced its peak demand by approximately 10% through demand response in 2013 (FERC 
2014). However, unlike the U.S. as a whole, large energy consuming industrial customers in the 
MISO market have not significantly contributed to actual peak demand reduction through 
dynamic pricing programs (Cappers et al. 2010). 
Understanding consumers’ abilities to respond to price changes is necessary in order to 
infer whether state-level retail markets with more price-responsive customers are associated with 
more price-responsive sub-regional wholesale markets during price-peaking hours. In addition, 
exploring industrial sector retail price responsiveness may also provide insights into where 
dynamic pricing programs might better access MISO’s underutilized industrial demand response 
resources.    
Papers in the demand response literature often show that demand response benefits 
customers as well as system reliability, but some questions remain (Loughran and Kulick 2004; 
DOE 2006). To what extent do consumers respond to price changes? What is the impact of state 
retail competition on demand response adoption of large industrial users? What is the relationship 
between state-influenced retail demand response and regional wholesale price responsiveness? As 
customers seek to reduce the cost of their electricity use and states seek to implement more 
demand response programs, improved understanding of price elasticities across regional 
wholesale electricity markets and different state-policy environments is critical to both the design 
and adoption of demand response (Cappers et al. 2010; Craig and Savage 2013).  
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In this essay, I estimate the industrial price elasticity of demand at the retail level and allow for 
the possibility of heterogeneity in price-responsiveness across states. Second, I estimate 
wholesale electricity demand in the MISO market, also accounting for heterogeneity across sub-
regions. Then, I discuss the implications of industrial demand response on wholesale market 
price-responsiveness.  In doing so, the study makes several contributions. First, it contributes to 
an understanding of how well price responsiveness on the part of retail industrial consumers is 
established in a deregulated state (e.g. Illinois) compared to in a regulated electricity state (e.g. 
Minnesota). Considering state-level industrial productivity and dynamic pricing adoption 
variation, this study analyzes industrial customers’ response to price changes in the long-run (i.e. 
annually) in a market environment where these industrial customers are assumed to operate, 
largely, within monthly flat retail rate electricity contracts. While applications of demand 
response can be found in residential, commercial and industrial sectors, I focus on the industrial 
sector. This sector is a high energy-using sector where electricity consumption varies 
significantly among industrial processes and peak demand reduction in these large industrial 
customers can be substantial. Second, this chapter provides an estimate of the current price 
response in the MISO wholesale market, where the electricity price is determined on an hour-by-
hour basis and where peak demand responds differently to the real-time price changes across sub-
regional hubs within the system. Third, this chapter provides a discussion on the connection 
between industrial price responsiveness at the state level and the price responsiveness in the 
wholesale market with respect to state demand response performance over time. There is 
currently a demand response capacity in the retail market in MISO states; however, demand 
response has not yet been implemented to its full potential, especially in the context of industrial 
customers. 
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2.2 Background  
2.2.1 Significance of Industrial Customers  
In this study, I focus on industrial customers in the MISO states. Studying industrial customers 
for demand response is important for three reasons. First, they consume a large amount of energy, 
particularly in the MISO (EIA 2014). The share of industrial sales across the whole of the U.S. is 
27% (EIA 2013) and 36% in the MISO. Second, large industrial customers are important to 
utilities because of the relatively high rates paid by industrial customers and large revenues 
generated by the segment. Utilities are thus open to offering alternative prices to sustain industrial 
customers such as block pricing (Spees and Lave 2007). A considerable portion of the demand 
response programs are offered to the industrial customers in MISO market (Bharvirkar et al. 
2008). Third, industrial customers have strong incentives to increase load management and 
energy efficiency through state and federal programs (Borenstein, 2005; Energy Star 2014) and 
often have the technical capability to manage their electricity demand (e.g., smart meters, energy 
management units within a plant and industrial energy efficient technologies) (Gillingham et al. 
2006). Ultimately, industrial customers in the Midwest constitute approximately 14,800MW of 
peak demand reduction capacity, where residential customers make up only 6,000MW of peak 
demand reduction capacity (Cappers et al. 2010). They are, therefore, a key resource in the wider 
implementation of demand response.  
Studies have found that price elasticity can range between -0.2 and -0.7 for residential 
customers, and there is little evidence for elastic demand in either the residential or commercial 
sector (Bernstein and Griffin 2005; Bohi and Zimmerman 1984; Houthakker et al. 1974; 
Labandeira et al. 2010; Maddala et al. 1997). Bernstein and Griffin (2005) found significant 
differences in the residential and commercial price elasticity of demand for electricity among 
states and regions in the US. Most recently, Pielow et al. (2012) estimated industrial and 
commercial sector short-term and long-term price elasticity of demand in four different states 
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(Ohio, Michigan, Texas and Virginia) and found differences in the price of elasticity demand 
across regions. The few studies that considered electricity demand estimated the price elasticity of 
demand for industrial consumers to be between -0.14 and -0.6 (Elkhaifif 1992; Goldman et al. 
2007).  
Shwarz (2002), Patrick and Wolak (2001), Fan and Hyndman (2011) and Lijesen (2007) 
measured real-time elasticity. These studies found that the real-time price elasticity of electricity 
consumption is lower than the elasticity estimated with annual or monthly data. Their estimated 
real-time elasticity ranged between -0.04 and 0.43.With the exception of the Shwarz et al. (2002) 
study, these studies concluded that demand response to real-time price changes might not be very 
effective in reducing the quantity demanded due to the low price elasticity of demand (Lijesen 
2007, Patrick and Wolak 2001). However, Shwarz et al. (2002) showed that depending on the 
customer category (e.g. industrial customers with interruptible production processes) and the time 
of day or a month in a year, quantity changes could be substantial. A small price elasticity rate did 
not necessarily indicate a small reduction in the industrial electricity demanded in real time 
(Shwarz et al. 2002).  
2.2.2 Demand Response in the MISO 
Utilities offer demand response programs to residential, commercial, and industrial customers in 
the MISO. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) collects data on utility demand 
response programs offered to end-use customers every year. In the retail market in 2013, 
including residential, commercial and industrial customers, there was on average 11,100MW of 
estimated capacity for peak demand reduction in the MISO footprint, where only 2,412MW of 
peak demand was actually reduced. North Dakota (6,482MW) and Indiana (763MW) have the 
highest potential (i.e. maximum peak demand reduction capacity) peak demand reduction 
capacity whereas Montana (0MW) and Missouri (13MW) have the lowest potential peak demand 
reduction capacity from demand response. However, states usually did not reach their maximum 
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capacity of demand response. For example, in 2013, the actual peak demand reduction in 
Minnesota was only 43MW and in Wisconsin, it was only 22MW. North Dakota, with the highest 
potential peak demand reduction capacity, has actually reduced 11% of the potential peak demand 
reduction capacity.  
In 2013, Minnesota and Wisconsin had the highest number of customers enrolled in 
dynamic pricing programs (3883 in Minnesota, 2538 in Wisconsin), whereas Montana had the 
lowest number of customers enrolled in dynamic pricing programs (90). The total cost of the 
incentives paid to the industrial customers by the utilities also varies across the states that 
participate in dynamic pricing programs. These incentives may include the cash rebates and 
reductions in tariffs for industrial customers in return to their participation in the dynamic pricing 
programs. Minnesota has the highest spending on the incentives for industrial customers to 
participate in any type of demand response program while Montana has the lowest amount of 
incentives paid to the industrial customers.  
Figure 2.1 shows the total number of industrial customers enrolled in dynamic pricing 
programs and the total cost of the financial incentives paid for the industrial customers to 
participate in demand response programs in 2013. Figure 2.2 shows the potential capacity of peak 
demand reduction from any types of demand response programs including interruptible load and 
direct load control and the total number of customers with any other type of DR programs besides 
dynamic pricing in 2013.  
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Figure 2. 1: Total Cost of the Incentives Paid to the Industrial Customers (Color-Coded) 
and Number of Industrial Customers (overlay values) with Dynamic Pricing Programs in 
2013  (Source: Energy Information Administration, 2013) 
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Figure 2. 2: Potential Peak Demand Savings (Color-coded) and Total Number of Industrial 
Customers (overlay values) with Any Type of Demand Response Programs in 2013 
There are various types of demand response programs offered in the MISO (Earle et al. 
2008; Heffner and Sedano 2008; Pfienberger and Hajos, 2011). 
Incentive Based Programs 
 Direct Load Control (DLC): Load serving entity contracts directly with the customer to 
reduce/curtail electricity use. For example, direct load control program participants are 
often paid $5 to $6 kW/month. 
 Interruptible Load (ILoad): Electricity users agree to curtail a certain amount of 
electricity usage through a pre-defined agreement, and the customers may be subject to a 
penalty if they do not reduce their use under agreed conditions. For example, interruptible 
rate program participants are usually subsidized with $6kW/month payment. 
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Dynamic Pricing Programs  
 Time-of-Use (TOU): The electricity customer is provided with different fixed rates 
among the on-peak and off-peak periods; however, the customer is not able to change the 
response dynamically. 
 Critical Peak Pricing (CPP): The electricity customer is informed about the dynamic 
pricing of electricity production, and they reduce the electricity consumption during peak 
hours and reduce the electricity costs they incur. The customer receives calls from the 
load serving entity during peak hours, and the customer chooses to respond or not to 
respond to the peak prices. 
 Real-Time Pricing (RTP): The electricity customer is informed about hourly prices and 
can decide to reduce consumption when prices are high. This DR resource provides 
customers with the most accurate electricity supply costs.  
The type of dynamic pricing programs offered in the states also varies. All MISO states have 
Time-Of-Use prices as of 2013 but states that have high incentive payments for industrial 
customer to participate in demand response programs (e.g.  Minnesota) or states that have high 
potential peak demand reduction capacity (e.g. North Dakota) do not have Real-Time Pricing 
programs. Real-Time Pricing programs are mostly offered in deregulated states (e.g., Illinois, 
Michigan, and Ohio) in the MISO region. I present the type of dynamic pricing programs that are 
offered in 2013 across MISO states in Appendix Table 2.1.   
This table shows that the level of demand response adoption by the industrial customers 
varies at the aggregate state level and industrial customers in any type of demand response 
programs are not actually reducing their peak demand to its full potential in MISO states. This 
indicates that there are differences in these states with respect to the level of responding to the 
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price changes. Therefore, quantifying the variation in price elasticity across the states is important 
for industrial demand response adoption in the MISO region.  
2.3 Methods 
2.3.1 Annual Retail Market Model  
I estimate industrial and total electricity demand in the retail market of the MISO footprint using 
a fixed-effects estimation method. I assume a Cobb-Douglas functional form for industrial 
electricity demand. Es,t represents the quantity of electricity consumed, where subscript s 
represents states and t represents years. Industrial electricity demand (Et,s) is a function of 
electricity price Ps,t, time-invariant state-specific factors (cs), such as market regulations that 
often do not easily change, the other covariates (Xt,s) that affect electricity demand such as 
employment (Lt,s
emp
), natural gas prices (Pt,s
NG), outside temperature (Wt,s
temp
), and a random error 
term εt,s that is assumed to be identically and independently distributed with zero mean and 
constant variance εt~(0, σ
2):  
Et,s = csPt,s
β1Xt,s
β2eεt,s                                                                            (2.1) 
where Xt,s ∈ {Lt,s
emp
, Pt,s
NG, Wt,s
temp
}. 
Transforming the model by taking natural log, I get: 
lnEt,s = lncs + β1lnPt,s + β2lnXt,s + εt,s                                                           (2.2) 
Similar to the work of Houthakker (1974), Bohi and Zimmerman (1984), Gately and 
Huntington (2002), Bernstein and Griffin (2006), Erdogdu (2010), and Alberini and Flippini 
(2011), a dynamic transformation of the model can be made by assuming partial adjustment 
behavior (Liu, 2004). Suppose Es,t
∗  is the optimal demand for electricity which is unobservable to 
researchers: 
lnEs,t
∗ = ms + β1lnPs,t + β2lnXs,t + εs,t                                                           (2.3) 
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Consumers may not be able to adjust instantly to the optimal amount of electricity 
consumed when the price fluctuates due to technological barriers (e.g., adjusting/adopting smart 
meters may take some time), production constraints (e.g., some industrial consumers cannot 
change their production schedule immediately in response to price changes), or tariffs and 
agreements (e.g., consumers may agree to purchase at a certain price during the year). Therefore, 
the dynamic relationship between the optimal electricity demand (lnEs,t
∗ ) and the actual electricity 
demand (lnEs,t) is adjusted with 𝛿 as the coefficient. A larger 𝛿 implies faster adjustment to the 
optimal demand based on the actual demand (Liu, 2004): 
lnEs,t − lnEs,t−1 = δ(lnEs,t
∗ − lnEs,t−1).                                                (2.4) 
Substituting lnEs,t
∗  into the equilibrium equation yields: 
lnEs,t − lnEs,t−1 = δ(ms + β1lnPs,t + β2lnXs,t + εs,t − lnEs,t−1).                                   (2.5) 
The estimated equation becomes: 
lnEs,t = δms + (1 − δ)lnEs,t−1 + δβ1lnPs,t + δβ2lnXs,t + δεs,t .                                          (2.6) 
Electricity price (lnPs,t) is endogenous because it is determined, in part, by the demand 
for electricity. It is thus correlated with the error term.  Thus, I employ instrumental variables 
(lnZs,t = GSPs,t, Ps,t−1) that are correlated with the endogenous variable (i.e. electricity price) and 
uncorrelated with the error term in the first equation to estimate price of electricity. For 
instrument, I include annual Gross State Product (GSP) for all industries in each state, excluding 
the value added by utilities to address this issue. GSP measures the annual total value added by 
the industry at the state level. Change in industry value added increases electricity generation in a 
state, which affects the price of electricity. Change in electricity price affects electricity 
demanded but only through change in state industry value added. However, state GSP is a weak 
instrument. Thus, I add the lagged electricity price (lnPs,t−1) as an instrument, which affects the 
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current price of electricity and ultimately electricity demanded6. The expected direction of impact 
is positive, an increase in the previous year’s electricity price also increases the electricity price in 
the current year. Therefore, the estimated demand equation becomes:  
lnEs,t = δcs + δβ1lnPs,t + δβ2lnXs,t + δβ3lnEs,t−1 + δβ4INTERs + δβ5YEARs + δβ6DRs,t +
vs,t ,                                                                                                                                                                             (2.7)  
where Zi,s,t  =  (GSPs,t, Ps,t−1), s = states, t = time, and i = index for instruments  
The assumption that the error term is not correlated with the electricity prices or with 
other covariates in the model is tested: Cov(εs,t,|Ps,t, Xs,t, cs) = 0. The instrumental variables Zs,t 
are also highly correlated with the endogenous variable, industrial electricity price (Ps,t), and 
uncorrelated with the error term εt,s (Cov (Ps,t, zs,t) ≠ 0 and Cov (εs,t, zs,t) = 0). I tested whether 
the identification restrictions are satisfied and whether the equations are weakly identified, using 
the Hansen-Sargan (1982) test statistics for validity of the identification restrictions (H0: 
identification restrictions are satisfied). I use partial F-statistics (H0: Equation is weakly 
identified) and Cragg-Donald Wald for identification (H0: Endogenous regressors are 
unidentified) test. I present the test statistics in Appendix Table 2.2. The Hansen-Sargan statistic 
shows that identification restrictions are satisfied, the partial F-statistic shows that the instruments 
are not weak, and the Cragg- Donald Wald statistic is higher than the 10% tolerable bias level, 
which indicates that the endogenous regressors are identified.   
The expected coefficient of the industrial price (lnPs,t) is negative. As price of electricity 
goes up, electricity demanded by the industrial customers should decrease. Further, I expect to find a 
positive relationship between one-year lagged electricity demand (lnEs,t−1) and the electricity 
                                                 
6 One can be concerned about the correlation between the industrial sales per customer and the lagged 
industrial price. I test whether significant correlation between these two variables and there is not 
statistically significant correlation (Pairwise correlation is -0.0249). I present the first-stage regression 
results in Appendix Table 2.6. 
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demand in the current year (lnEs,t) because I expect industrial customers to, at minimum, 
maintain their industrial production. Therefore, I would observe strong persistence in the 
electricity demand from year to year. If the current electricity demand is high, it would increase 
expected future electricity demand. The natural gas price (ln Ps,t
NG) delivered to the industrial 
customers is included as an alternative fuel to electricity. However, the expected impact of the 
natural gas prices in industrial electricity demand is ambiguous. In the majority of the residential 
electricity demand studies, natural gas prices are usually found to be a substitute for electricity 
because there are significant numbers of customers using gas for heating their homes. However, 
industrial processes may also use natural gas along with electricity. Therefore, the net effect can only 
be determined empirically. I also include the total number of employees in the manufacturing sector 
(Lt,s
emp
) as a socioeconomic variable to control for the size of the industry in each state. Similar to the 
natural gas prices, the net effect of the number of employees in manufacturing on industrial 
electricity demand is ambiguous. Electricity demand may be lower in in the states with labor-
intensive manufacturing industries. For example, cement manufacturing industry is one of the largest 
energy intensive manufacturing industries while the amount of labor used during the production 
process is quite small (KEMA 2005). A study by Cox et al. (2013) also found that labor intensity and 
electricity consumption are substitutable inputs in manufacturing sector. On the other hand, a large 
number of employees may signify a big manufacturing sector in a state and hence, electricity demand 
may be higher. Finally, I include temperature (lnWt,s
temp
) to control for the effect of the outdoor 
temperature on industrial electricity demand. I expect to find a small positive effect on industrial 
electricity demand because industrial customers do not change the bulk of their electricity 
consumption with respect to changes in weather conditions.  
As an indicator for the effect of industrial demand response (DRs,t) on electricity demand 
in the retail market, I estimate the impact of potential peak demand reduction and actual peak 
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demand reduction on industrial electricity demand. I expect lower electricity demand with higher 
amount of industrial potential peak demand reduction. Similarly, with higher compliance in peak 
demand reduction, industrial demand is expected to decrease.  
I control for all the years (YEARS) between 2000 and 2013, where 2013 is the omitted 
category. I expect to find lower electricity demand in all of the years relative to 2013 assuming that 
industrial electricity demand increases over time.  Finally, I include an interaction term of the state 
dummy variables with price (INTERs = state ∗ lnPs,t) in order to capture the state-elasticity 
estimated per state and we expect to find negative price elasticity of demand in each state as well. I 
summarize these hypotheses on the variable coefficients in Table 2.1. 
Table 2. 1: Expected Coefficients of the Regression Variables 
 
 
Variable Hypotheses  Expected 
Sign 
Electricity 
Price 
Increase in industrial electricity price decreases electricity 
demanded by the industrial customers 
- 
Industry GSP Increase in industrial value-added increases demand for 
electricity, which increases electricity price that industrial 
customers face 
+ 
Lagged 
Electricity 
Load 
Higher industrial electricity demand during the previous year 
increases the industrial electricity demand in the current year 
+ 
Number of 
Employees 
 Electricity demand is lower in labor-intensive manufacturing      
processes  
+/- 
Natural Gas 
Price 
 Increase in industrial natural gas prices increases/decreases 
electricity demand 
+/- 
Temperature   Electricity demand is higher in higher outdoor temperature  + 
Potential Peak 
DR 
 Increase in industrial potential peak demand reduction capacity  
decreases  industrial  electricity demand 
- 
Actual Peak 
DR 
 Increase in industrial actual peak demand reduction capacity 
decreases  industrial  electricity demand 
- 
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2.3.2 Real-Time Wholesale Market Model  
In the wholesale market, power generating and distributing electric utilities and load serving 
aggregators buy and sell electricity in an hourly market.  I assume a Cobb-Douglas functional 
form for the real-time wholesale demand, where Eh,dthe real-time electricity is demand and Ph,d 
is the real-time price for electricity in the wholesale market:  
Eh,d = β0Ph,d
β1 eωh,d .                                                              (2.8) 
Transforming the model by taking the natural log, I get: 
lnEh,d = β0 + β1lnPh,d + 𝜔h,d.                                                    (2.9) 
Real time market dispatches every five minutes during all hours of a day. Power plants 
that are committed to serve electricity in the real-time market are determined in every five 
minutes. These dispatches and responses are monitored by the MISO market. The committed 
power plants will decide the amount of electricity they are going to supply at a certain price in the 
next five minutes in the real-time market. Electricity buyers in the real-time market may not 
instantaneously respond to real-time price changes because electricity supply is updated every 
five minutes. Expected demand is subject to available power plant capacity at that hour as well as 
the system conditions (e.g. congestion) in current hour. Therefore, the anticipated electricity 
demand in the following hour is informed by the current demand. Following the similar steps for 
the equations 2.3 through 2.7, the real-time electricity demand becomes: 
lnEh,d = β0cd + (1 − δ)lnEh,d−1 + δβ1lnPh,d + δωh,d.                                           (2.10) 
Considering the endogeneity due to the relationship between real-time price and real-time 
electricity demand, I use instruments for real-time price. I use hourly temperature for all MISO 
states (lnTEMPh,d) as instrument for the price of electricity (lnPh,d), where h =hours of a day and 
d =days. I include hourly lagged real-time electricity price (lnPh−1,d) into the first-stage of the 
estimation. Consequently, the estimated equation with instrumental variables is:  
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lnEh,d = β0 + trend + β1lnPh,d
∗ + +β2lnPh,d
2
+ β3lnEh−1,d+β4PEAKh,d + β5gHOURSg + β6iDAYi + β7mMONTHm + β8jYEARj + β9LWYy
+ β10TG𝑦 + β11intermintemp + β12intermaxtemp +  γ13DRh,d
+ θh,d.                                                                                                                                                 (2.11) 
In the second stage, I include a squared term of the real-time prices (lnPh,d
2 ), expecting to 
find a positive coefficient because the responsiveness to real-time price changes is expected to be 
increasing at decreasing rate (e.g., the responsiveness to large spikes in market prices should be 
lower than price responsiveness to small increase in the real-time price).  Additionally, I include 
an interaction term with real-time prices and dummy variables for the peak hours (PEAKh,d) of 
each day between 8am and 10pm; dummy variables for the last week of December (LWYy) and 
for Thanksgiving day (TGy) for each year y, which are two of the highest electricity consumption 
times of the year; and dummy variables for hours (HOURSg) where g=1,2...,24, days (DAYi) 
where i=1,2…,31, months (MONTHm), where m=1,2…,12 and years (YEARj), where j=2008, 
2013. Finally, I include an interaction term of real-time price elasticity with the dummy variables, 
which takes the value “1” during maximum and minimum temperature during peak hours 
(intermintemp, intermaxtemp), a monthly trend. θh,d is the random error term that is assumed to 
be identically and independently distributed with zero mean and constant variance θh,d~(0, σ
2). I 
expect to find very small price responsiveness during extreme temperatures because there is high 
demand for electricity during very cold and hot times. However, during extremely cold winter or 
extremely hot summer days, electricity intensive manufacturing processes may demand more 
electricity in order to avoid any interruption in the machinery or inventory. Large manufacturing 
plants may have a smaller responses to real-time price changes (e.g., food manufacturing plants 
may be sensitive to extremely hot temperatures or machinery can be broken as a result of freezing 
  42 
temperatures). Similarly, residential customers consume higher amount of electricity during 
especially extremely hot temperatures during summer due to air conditioning needs.  
Further, I obtain information on the timing of the system peak demand events in MISO between 
2008 and 2013. I include these dates and hours interacting with the real-time prices (DRh,d) and 
estimate the price elasticity at those specific DR event hours. These DR events include extreme 
weather events and emergency system reliability reductions. For example, I control for the 
extreme cold weather event that occurred on January 22, 2013. I present the DR events dates in 
Appendix Table 2.5.  
The estimation procedure includes different times of day. First, I estimate the price 
elasticity of demand for a day, controlling for all hours of the day by including dummy variables 
for each hour. I then estimate price elasticity of demand for on-peak hours. I define two different 
on-peak hours: between 8am and 10pm, and between 3pm and 8pm. Daily peak in MISO is 
usually assumed to be between 8am and 10pm. However, the majority of the system congestion 
has historically occurred between 3pm and 8pm. I also estimate the price elasticity of demand for 
DR event days only. Finally, I estimate price elasticity of demand for off-peak hours (i.e., hours 
outside of 8am to 10pm). I estimate the price elasticity of the wholesale market for the years 
between 2008 and 2013. I also estimate the two-stage model for the Illinois hub, the Minnesota 
hub, and the Michigan hub separately.  
In the first stage, I expect that the real-time price will increase with higher temperatures 
in MISO states. In other words, the relationship between the hourly temperature variables and the 
real-time price is expected to be positive. I expect to find a negative real-time price elasticity of 
demand in the second-stage for all of the estimations. Further, I expect to find higher price-
responsiveness from the estimations of different on-peak hours and DR events, which is 
consistent with the hypothesis that demand response serves as a resource to reduce peak demand 
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during on-peak hours. Assuming that utility-based programs are targeting retail customer during 
high load hours, wholesale market participants are expected to be more responsive during on-
peak hours. . I also expect to find a positive relationship between the hourly electricity demand 
and peak hour dummies as well as last week of the year and Thanksgiving days.  I summarize my 
hypotheses on the variable coefficients in real-time market model in Table 2.2. 
Table 2. 2: Expected Coefficients of the Regression Variables 
Variable Hypotheses  Expected 
Sign 
Real-Time Price  Increase in real-time electricity price decreases 
electricity demanded  
- 
Hourly Temperature Real-time price of electricity is higher at higher prices  + 
Peak Hours*Price Increase in real-time price during peak hours decreases 
electricity demanded  
- 
DRevent*Price Increase in real-time price during DR events decreases 
electricity demanded 
- 
MinTempDum*Price Increase in real-time price during extremely cold 
temperatures decreases electricity demanded  
+/- 
MaxTempDum*Price Increase in real-time price during extremely hot 
temperatures decreases electricity demanded  
+/- 
Holiday Dummies Real-time electricity demand is higher during holiday 
(e.g., last week of December and Thanksgiving days) 
+ 
2.4.Data 
2.4.1 Retail Market Data 
The primary data source for the annual industrial demand analysis was the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) 861 Electric Power Annual Reports, which includes utility-level electricity 
distribution data to the residential, commercial, industrial, and total electricity consumers. Data 
includes state electricity sales to the industrial sector. I also retrieve industrial retail electricity 
prices from the same dataset. I aggregate the utility level sales data at the state level and obtain 
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total industrial sales, revenues, and the number of industrial electricity customers for 13 states 
across the MISO footprint between 2000 and 2013. Industrial and total electricity prices vary 
across states and over time. I adjust these prices to real industrial and real total electricity prices 
using an annual GDP deflator (The World Bank 2013). Between the years 2000 and 2013, the 
average annual electricity sold to industrial consumers was 2,984MWh per customer7, including 
the highest electricity sales to Illinois (7,493MWh/customer) and the lowest electricity sales to 
Nebraska (343MWh/customer). Between 2000 and 2013 the annual average electricity price was 
52 dollars/MWh, the highest average electricity price was 62 dollars/MWh in Michigan, and the 
lowest average electricity price was 42 dollars/MWh in Kentucky.  
I obtain peak demand reduction data also from EIA Reports. The maximum peak demand 
reduction capacity and the actual peak demand reduced vary across the states. States typically did 
not fully use their potential peak demand reduction capacity. Figure 2.3 shows the actual peak 
demand reduction in 20138. Actual peak demand reduction was significantly lower in some states 
(e.g., North Dakota). Some states with lower actual peak demand reduction have almost reached 
the potential maximum capacity (e.g. Ohio).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 In order to capture the state size effect, I scale the industrial sales with the total number of industrial 
customers for each state. Therefore, the estimation includes industrial demand per average customer.  
8 Here I only report DR figures for 2013 but aggregate DR potential peak and actual demand reduction 
comparison is provided in the Discussion Section.  
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Figure 2. 3: Compare Peak and Actual Industrial Demand Savings (MW) in 2013 
In 2013, the average number of industrial customers enrolled in demand response 
programs was 837 and there were 776 industrial customers with dynamic pricing programs in the 
MISO footprint. The average industrial potential peak demand reduction is 854MW and the 
average actual peak demand reduction was 186MW in 2013. I summarize the descriptive statistics 
of the retail market variables in Table 2.3.   
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Table 2. 3: Summary Statistics for Annual Industrial Data 2000-2013 
  
2.4.2 Wholesale Market Data  
 
The MISO wholesale market data includes real-time locational marginal prices (LMPs) and 
hourly load generation for the years 2008 and 2013.9 Real-time LMPs represent the additional 
value of an electricity load delivered to a specific LMP node, which is called the Critical Pricing 
                                                 
9 For the hourly data after December 13, 2013, the MISO changed their reporting regions; therefore, to 
maintain consistency, I did not include data after this date. 
Variable Description Notation Mean Range 
Price 
(dollars/MWh)  
Average* Electricity 
Prices 
Pt,s 50.4 [30.01-70.7] 
Ind. Electricity  
Sales Per Customer 
(MWh) 
Amount of Electricity 
Sold per Industrial 
Customer  
Et,s 2,984 [200-9,781] 
Temperature (℉)   Annual Temperature Wt,s
temp
 48.4 [38.3 - 58.5] 
Industry GSP ($ 
million) 
Gross State Product 
All Industries without 
Utility  
GSPt,s 218,7
95 
[17,702 - 
710,409] 
Industry size 
(thousand)  
 Number of Employees 
in Manufacturing 
Sector 
Lt,s
emp
 339 [17- 1,021] 
Natural Gas Price  
($/thousand cubic 
feet) 
 Industrial natural gas 
prices 
Pt,s
NG 7.14 [2.75-12.71] 
Potential Peak DR 
(MW) 
Potential Peak Demand 
with DR 
DRPotentialCap 854 [0-6,482] 
Actual Peak DR 
(MW) 
Actual Peak Demand 
Reduced with DR 
DRActualCap 186 [0-728] 
Number of Observations=182 
*Average over all utilities in each state 
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Node (CPN) in the MISO. The temperature data includes the hourly average of all climate 
stations at the states across the MISO footprint. Table 2.4 summarizes the wholesale market data 
for 2008 and 2013.   
Table 2. 4: Summary Statistics for Wholesale Market Data 2008 and 2013 
Variable Description Mean 
2008 
Range 2008 Mean 
2013 
Range 2013 
Electricity 
load (MWh) 
Amount of 
electricity  
63,881 [43,294 - 97,060] 58,197 [38,181-
95,400] 
Real-time 
electricity 
price ($/MW) 
Hourly real-
time price of 
electricity  
48 [-240 - 451] 30 [-29 - 929] 
Temperature 
(℉) 
Hourly 
temperature  
45.8 [-3.9 - 84.5] 46.2 [-3.3 - 88.3] 
Min 
Temperature 
(℉) 
Hourly 
minimum 
temperature 
45 [-5 - 84] 45.1 [-3.9 -  87.2] 
Max 
Temperature 
(℉) 
Hourly 
maximum 
temperature  
47 [-3.2 - 84] 47.3 [-2.5 - 89.2] 
Number of observation: 8764 for each year 
2.5 Results 
2.5.1 Annual Retail Market Estimation Results  
I capture the state fixed-effects with the dummy variables generated for each state and calculate 
elasticity values by summing parameter coefficients on industrial price (lnPs,t) and state 
interaction dummies (INTERS): δβ1 + δβ4 (Equation 2.7) for the retail market. Elasticity 
estimates for the retail industrial customers vary across the states and state elasticity estimates 
(β1 + β4) for the industrial consumers range between (0.08-0.42), which is within the range 
estimated by previous studies. Industrial price elasticity estimates in the states show that a 10% 
increase electricity prices in a state is associated with a decrease in industrial electricity demand 
per average customer by about 2.7% in Iowa, 2.3% in Illinois, 2.4% in Indiana, 2.7% in 
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Kentucky, 4.2% in Michigan, 3.6% in Minnesota, 3.0% in Missouri, 0.8% in Montana, 2.1% in 
Nebraska, 2.2% in North Dakota, 2.9% in Ohio, 1.6% in South Dakota and 1.1% in Wisconsin. 
Table 2.5 summarizes annual industrial retail market estimation results including two-stage 
estimation10 with the potential peak demand reduction and actual peak demand reduction with 
demand response programs offered to the industrial customers in the MISO footprint. I also 
include the estimated state-specific elasticity estimates in Table 2.6. I jointly test the null 
hypothesis that state-elasticity estimates are not statistically different across the states using F-test. I 
reject the null hypothesis (H0: δβ4,IAINTERIA = δβ4,ILINTERIL = ⋯ = 0)  that state elasticity 
estimates are not different with 15% significance level (F-stat: 2.51; Prob > chi2: 0.1158). 
Individual state price elasticity estimates are significant at least at the 10% level except for 
Illinois, Montana and Wisconsin. Figure 2.4 shows the price elasticity estimates for industrial 
customers in the states of the MISO footprint.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Comparison of the OLS and instrumental variable estimation results are presented in Appendix Table 
2.4.  
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Figure 2. 4: Industrial Price Elasticity Estimates in Retail Market 
The effect of the potential peak demand reduction is significant at the 15% significance 
level while actual peak demand reduction is significant at 10% significance level with respect to 
annual retail market electricity demand per customer (See Table 2.5). The effects of potential 
peak demand reduction capacity and actual peak demand reduction on electricity demand by 
industrial customers are quite small and similar in magnitude. A 10% increase in the industrial 
actual peak demand reduction capacity is associated with about 0.19% lower industrial electricity 
demand. This suggests that the industrial customers in the retail market might become more 
capable of managing electricity consumption with regard to price changes, likely through their 
increased understanding of their energy requirements as part of planning and assessment 
necessary to determine the value of demand response program participation. 
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If there is a 10% increase in the number of employees in the manufacturing sector, 
industrial electricity demand decreases by 5.9%. Based on the regression results, natural gas is a 
substitute for electricity (i.e., estimated coefficient is positive). If there is 10% increase in natural 
gas prices, electricity demand increases by 1.4%. However, the coefficient estimate is not 
significantly different from zero. A 10% increase in industrial electricity demand in the previous 
year significantly increases industrial electricity demand by about 5.4%. Finally, industrial 
electricity demand is about 1.9% higher with a 10% increase in outdoor temperature but the effect 
of outdoor temperature on electricity demand is insignificant. The signs of the explanatory 
variables are consistent with our initial hypotheses including the coefficients on the year and state 
interaction dummy variables.  
Table 2. 5: Results from Annual Industrial Retail Models 
 Potential Peak DR Capacity Actual Peak DR Capacity 
Real Industrial Price -0.109 -0.169* 
 (-1.05) (-1.52) 
Lagged Industrial Sales 0.548*** 0.574*** 
 (3.56) (3.81) 
 Manufacturing Employment -0.592* -0.656** 
 (-1.87) (-2.05) 
Real NG Price 0.140 0.156 
 (1.07) (1.14) 
Temperature 0.190 0.208 
 (0.24) (0.25) 
Potential Peak Reduction -0.019**  
 (-2.33)  
Actual Peak Reduction  -0.019* 
  (-1.67) 
R-square 0.638 0.637 
t statistics in parentheses   * p<0.1  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 
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Table 2. 6: Regional Elasticity Estimates Retail Market 
State  Coefficient 
Std. 
Error 
T P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Iowa  -0.27** 0.09 -2.89 0.05 -0.46 -0.09 
Illinois -0.23 0.17 -1.41 0.16 -0.57 0.09 
Indiana  -0.24* 0.10 -2.42 0.02 -0.44 -0.04 
Kentucky  -0.27*** 0.07 -3.92 0.00 -0.41 -0.14 
Michigan  -0.42*** 0.13 -3.26 0.00 -0.68 -0.17 
Minnesota -0.36*** 0.12 -3.04 0.00 -0.59 -0.12 
Missouri  -0.30*** 0.09 -3.30 0.00 -0.48 -0.12 
Montana  -0.08 0.08 -0.93 0.35 -0.24 0.09 
Nebraska  -0.21* 0.09 -2.45 0.02 -0.38 -0.04 
North Dakota -0.22* 0.09 -2.32 0.02 -0.40 -0.03 
Ohio -0.29*** 0.10 -2.95 0.00 -0.49 -0.10 
South Dakota -0.16** 0.09 -1.70 0.09 -0.35 0.03 
Wisconsin  -0.11 0.10 -1.05 0.30 -0.32 0.10 
*WI is the reference category   
 
I also test for whether the elasticity estimates at different hubs are different and I check 
for the validity of the instruments for the wholesale market model. Appendix Table 2.3 presents 
the test results for the instrumental variables. The Hansen-Sargan statistic shows that 
identification restrictions are satisfied, partial F-statistic shows that the instruments are not weak 
and Cragg- Donald Wald that endogenous regressors are identified based on the 10% tolerable 
bias level.    
2.5.2 Real-time Wholesale Market Estimation Results  
I calculate price elasticity in the real-time wholesale market by summing the coefficient estimates 
of hourly real-time price (lnPh,d), squared price (lnPh,d
2 ) and the interaction term of peak hours 
and real-time price (β1 + 2 ∙ β2 + β4 ∙ PEAK)
11 (Equation 2.12). I present estimation results of 
price elasticity estimates for the entire MISO market, as well as Minnesota, Illinois and Michigan 
                                                 
11 This is derived from the first order conditions of Equation 2.10. For different estimations provided in 
Table 8, I follow the similar approach if there is additional interaction terms included into the regression.  
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hubs at different times-of-day between 2008 and 2013 in Table 2.7 in Results section below. I 
present the bootstrapped standard errors (StataCorp, 2013).  
Table 2. 7: Regional Elasticity Estimates Wholesale Market 2008 and 2013 
Time-of-Day/ 
Location  
All Day On Peak 
Hours 
8am – 10pm 
On Peak 
Hours  
3pm-8pm 
DR Event  Off-Peak  
MISO 
 
-0.09*** 
(8.66) 
-0.214*** 
(10.42) 
-0.147** 
(6.18) 
-0.06* 
(1.85) 
-0.06*** 
(4.82) 
Minnesota Hub -0.107* 
(1.95) 
-0.209*** 
(8.32) 
-0.167*** 
(5.94) 
-0.086 
(1.61) 
-0.064** 
(3.36) 
Illinois Hub -0.12*** 
(5.31) 
-0.144*** 
(3.92) 
-0.098** 
(2.68) 
-0.063 
(1.27) 
-0.14*** 
(3.29) 
Michigan Hub -0.103*** 
(5.95) 
-0.120*** 
(2.81) 
-0.160*** 
(3.58) 
-0.135* 
(1.72) 
-0.008 
(0.56) 
t-statistics in parenthesis * p<0.1  ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
 
The price elasticity of hourly electricity demand is relatively small in the wholesale 
market as compared to the retail market. In the MISO electricity market between 2008 and 2013, 
a one percent increase in real-time price was associated with 0.09% decrease in hourly electricity 
demanded. Real-time price responsiveness is significant for all hours at 1% significance level. 
During on-peak hours and DR events, there is also significant response to real-time price changes. 
Electricity demanded is reduced by about 0.15% between 3pm and 8pm and by 0.06% during a 
DR event with a one percent increase in the real-time price in the MISO market. During off-peak 
hours, a one percent increase in the real-time price leads to a 0.06% reduction in electricity 
demanded.  
At specific pricing hubs, Minnesota, Michigan and Illinois, I find higher daily price 
responsiveness compared to the overall MISO estimates. One percent increase real-time price 
decreases electricity demanded by 0.11% in Minnesota hub, 0.12% in Illinois and 0.10% in 
Michigan. I also find significant response during on-peak hours at these hubs as well, where 
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Minnesota has the highest real-time price responsiveness and Michigan has the lowest price 
responsiveness between 8am and 10pm. However, during a DR event, I only find weak price 
responsiveness at Michigan hub while Minnesota and Illinois hubs does not show any evidence of 
price responsiveness. A one percent increase in real-time price during off-peak hours is associated 
with a significant reduction in electricity demanded by 0.064% in Minnesota and 0.144% in 
Illinois hub.  
The interaction terms on maximum (intermaxtemp) and minimum (intermintemp) 
temperature during peak hours are statistically significant for the MISO market and all pricing 
hubs. The sign of the coefficient is statistically significant and negative for both of the variables 
intermintemp and intermaxtemp. The magnitude of the impact on the electricity demanded is 
negligible however. This result suggests that there is responsiveness to price changes during 
extreme temperatures but not as much as during average temperatures. This finding is consistent 
with the initial hypothesis is that it is hard to give up on the electricity consumption during 
extremely cold or hot days for the real-time market participants. Electricity demand is also 
significantly influenced by the short run electricity demand. A 10% increase in the previous 
hour’s electricity consumption increases electricity demand by 9.7% for the MISO electricity 
market. Finally, hour time dummies are statistically significant for almost each hour between 8am 
and 10pm, and time dummies for Thanksgiving and the last week of the year are significant for 
the whole MISO market and other pricing hubs. The direction of the impacts of the interaction 
terms, time dummies, and short run electricity demand was the same for both 2008 and 
2013.Complete real-time market results for MISO are presented in Appendix Table 2.7.  
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2.6 Discussion  
 
Utility electricity rates are determined based on generation, transmission and distribution costs in 
a highly regulated environment. State policies toward the integration of demand response 
resources at the retail level across the U.S. have grown rapidly in the last decade, responding to 
and influencing increasingly competitive retail market environments- especially in electricity 
markets like PJM and NYISO (Walawalkar et al., 2010).   However, particularly in the heavily 
regulated MISO states, retail demand response program adoption and implementation – 
specifically among the industrial sector – has been relatively slow.  While operating at different 
temporal and spatial scales, MISO has advanced innovative wholesale market rules addressing 
geographic variation across generation, transmission, and distribution resources operating in day-
ahead, minute and sub-minute markets. The empirical analysis employed in this essay aims to  
explore the connection between the retail electricity market, in which industrial consumers often 
purchase electricity through relatively flat retail rates, and the wholesale electricity market, where 
market participants are able to change their electricity transactions based on real-time price 
changes. Although I was not able to directly estimate the causal relationship between the retail 
and wholesale price responsiveness with the existing data, my empirical analysis found evidence 
that industrial retail customers respond to price changes across MISO states and that the 
magnitude of price-responsiveness varies by state. Further, there is evidence of significant real-
time price responsiveness in the wholesale market during on-peak hours, when the utility based 
dynamic pricing programs are often implemented.  In addition, this price responsiveness is 
strongest in sub-regions where long-term industrial retail price-responsiveness is highest (i.e. 
Michigan and, to a lesser extent Minnesota). Customer exposure to real-time price signals at the 
retail level is limited and, consequently, affects demand serviced through wholesale transactions. 
Moreover, the level of regulation and demand response adoption varies by state – hence, the 
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implications for industrial demand response programs will likely be different in each state. For 
example, Minnesota has a strongly regulated electricity market, creating barriers to transacting 
bundled demand response resources. But, it also has the largest number of customers agreeing to 
provide demand response capacity in large part due to relatively high incentives for industrial 
customer participation. Minnesota’s estimated retail industrial price elasticity of electricity 
demand as well as on-peak price-responsiveness in the wholesale market is higher compared to 
relatively deregulated states such as Illinois and Ohio. Also, Minnesota has the highest total peak 
demand reduction capacity compared to Illinois and Michigan. Illinois, which is one of the 
deregulated states in MISO footprint, has relatively inelastic industrial demand in the MISO 
footprint. The capacity for dynamic pricing for Illinois industrial customers is also the smallest 
among the three pricing hubs, the number of customers that is enrolled in dynamic pricing 
programs are not as high as Minnesota, and real-time price responsiveness is lower at the Illinois 
hub compared to the Minnesota hub. In Michigan, I observe a significantly higher price-
responsiveness during on-peak hours and insignificant response during off-peak hours, while 
retail industrial price-responsiveness in Michigan is estimated to be the highest in the MISO 
footprint. Also, the aggregated DR capacity in Michigan is the highest after Minnesota. Table 2.8 
provides a comparison of the industrial retail and real-time elasticity estimates as well as the total 
peak demand reduction capacity between 2000 and 2013 across Minnesota, Illinois and Michigan.  
Table 2. 8: Comparison of Regional Elasticity (absolute values) and Total DR Capacity 
Elasticity/ 
Location  
Industrial 
Retail Elasticity 
Wholesale 
Elasticity 
Peak Hours  
3pm-10pm 
Wholesale 
Elasticity 
DR Event 
Aggregated 
DR 
Capacity(GW) 
2000-2013 
Minnesota 0.36*** 0.167*** 0.086 13,341 
Illinois 0.23 0.098** 0.063 4,456 
Michigan  0.42*** 0.120*** 0.135* 6,059 
Note: Elasticity values are in absolute terms and * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
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Many states already have established price and incentive based demand response 
programs to some extent, but the contribution of peak demand reduction by the industrial 
customers is so small that the system wide industrial demand response implications are 
negligible. Although the analysis demonstrates that industrial customers respond to price changes, 
more industrial peak demand reduction may contribute to larger reductions in industrial electricity 
consumption. This could be motivated by looking closely into the differences in types of 
industries and differences in electricity demand profiles in a particular state. Therefore, demand 
response program design should consider the spatial and sectorial differences to involve more 
industrial customers in demand response programs.  
Finally, in order to make demand response more efficient in the retail electricity market, 
consumers will likely need to be more fully exposed to price signals from the wholesale market. 
This requires additional transparency of information between the wholesale and retail markets. 
The analysis looks at electricity demand at the retail and wholesale markets, and I find differences 
in the magnitude of the price responsiveness between the two markets. However, in both markets, 
I find significant price responsiveness. Results suggest that retail industrial customers respond 
significantly to price changes at a time scales commensurate with current longer-term pricing 
contracts.  Results also suggest that generation and distribution utilities transacting at the 
wholesale level are able to respond in modest ways to real-time price changes, even without the 
demand-pull of a price-informed retail market.  While it is not realistic to expect all retail 
customers to engage as wholesale market participants (Sioshansi and Vojdani 2001), industrial 
consumers with elastic demand may benefit significantly by participating dynamic pricing 
programs and the system will also likely benefit.   In fact, previous studies have pointed out that 
the electricity system benefits more from lower average electricity prices when only a small 
number of customers with flexible electricity demand respond to price changes (Kirschen 2003, 
Caves et al. 2000).  
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Current dynamic pricing programs, particularly in the MISO region, have not attempted 
to target industrial demand based on price responsiveness. This essay suggests that industrial 
customers respond to price changes differently across state regulatory environments and that 
wholesale price elasticities are highest in areas where industrial price responsiveness at the retail 
level is highest. Future research is needed to better understand industrial load across states to 
determine whether regional peak demand reduction by a targeted cluster of large energy users in 
certain parts of the footprint may contribute market-level efficiencies. Industrial adoption and 
efficiency of demand response policies could be improved by understanding the implications of 
these results.  Policy designers could identify those actors most able to respond to price signals 
and target fewer but more responsive, participants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  58 
2.7 Conclusions  
 
This essay estimates electricity demand in the retail and wholesale electricity market by 
employing a two-stage least squares estimation approach. I first analyze the industrial customers 
in the retail market at the state level, considering the state demand response programs offered by 
the utilities. I find that there is variation in retail industrial electricity demand across the states. At 
the wholesale level, I estimate the market demand at different pricing hubs in the MISO region, 
and I find lower price elasticity in the wholesale market than in the retail market. Although price 
responsiveness varies across these two markets, I find a similar pattern in the demand response 
implementation in Minnesota, Illinois and Michigan. Regions that are price-elastic tend to have 
more demand response adoption, particularly more dynamic types of demand response adoption 
(e.g., real-time pricing).  This essay also points out that regional differences and customer 
diversity should be taken seriously before designing uniform demand response programs for the 
whole system. Future research is needed to build improved understanding of industrial customers 
in different sectors and explore industrial price responsiveness and adoption of demand response 
across state regulatory and regional market governance environments. The empirical approach in 
this essay could be considerably improved with more granular consumer-level data.  
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Chapter 3 
Integration of Residential PV and Its Implications for Current and 
Future Residential Electricity Demand in the United States 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
After the federal government passed the Energy Policy Act in 2005, U.S. energy policy shifted 
towards fostering renewable energy investments. State level policies followed, incentivizing the 
renewable energy technologies and electricity generation from renewable resources.  For 
example, state Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS), one of the most successful state level 
policies for renewable energy developments, have promoted renewable energy generation since 
late 1990s by requiring states to generate a certain portion of their electricity from renewables 
(Wiser et al., 2007).  
Wind has been one of the most widely adopted renewable resources and it currently has 
the highest share in the renewable energy portfolio. The wind sector is now considered to be a 
mature industry (Dismukes 2012). Solar energy, however, is still an emerging technology, and 
could potentially lead to a sustainable electricity generation across the country (Wiginton et al. 
2010). Residential rooftop solar penetration in the U.S. has increased significantly over the past 
decade.  In the last quarter of 2012, residential rooftop PV capacity installations have exceeded 
1.5 GW in the U.S.  The projected increase in distributed generation capacity by residential solar 
is 9 GW by 2016 and 20 GW by 2020 (APPA, 2013). 
While state RPS policies incentivized utilities to generate renewable electricity, their 
impact has been limited in terms of customer-based distributed solar generation (Borchers et al., 
2014). Federal investment tax credits (ITC) and state net energy metering (NEM) regulations 
have played a more important role in the development of distributed generation. Decreasing 
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installation costs, technological advancements, alternative financing options and state and federal 
incentives have contributed to increasing trends for investments in residential solar in the U.S 
(ICF International, 2010).  For instance, solar installation costs have decreased by roughly 70 
percent since 2008, and federal tax credits have reduced initial installations costs for solar by 
about 30 percent12 (APPA, 2013). Third party solar is also becoming a popular financing option; 
it stimulates development of residential solar by offering residential customers the opportunity to 
generate electricity from solar without purchasing the equipment. Third party solar has two 
financing models: (1) power purchase agreement (PPA) and (2) lease.  Neither models requires an 
initial investment cost.  The PPA model offers customers an offset in their electricity bill in return 
to the electricity generated by the solar system. Developers typically sell that electricity to the 
customers for a lower rate (SEIA 2014a). The leasing model is designed as a contract between the 
customer and the developer. The customer pays a fixed monthly fee for solar energy generated 
and does not for the solar energy portion of the electricity (SEIA 2014a). The third-party solar 
financing has been an important catalyst of the increasing residential solar penetration. For 
example, about 90% of the residential solar in New Jersey was through third-party solar 
agreements as of 2013 and in states like California, Arizona and Colorado, third-party distributed 
generation is more than 60 percent (SEIA, 2014a) of total solar energy consumption. 
Distributed generation has a number of potential benefits including clean energy 
generation, avoided peak generation capacity, avoided or deferred transmission and distribution 
capacity investments reduced transmission line losses due to proximity to the generator source 
and lower customer bills due to generating electricity on-site (Chiradeja, 2004; Pepermans et al., 
2005; Darghouth et al., 2012; APPA, 2013). On the other hand, increased penetration of 
distributed generation creates challenges for the electric utilities as their sales decline.  Dubbed as 
                                                 
12 Federal tax credit will step down to 10 percent from 30 percent in 2017.  
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a “death spiral” by some industry experts, as more customers adopt distributed generation, 
utilities’ costs to maintain and operate the grid must be spread across a smaller customer base, 
raising customer rates and increasing the economic incentive to opt for more distributed 
generation (Kind, 2013; Costello and Hemphill, 2014).  Utilities also argue that distributed 
generation creates a fairness issue with transferring the transmission, distribution and reliability 
costs to the customers without distributed generation technologies (Raskin, 2014). More 
specifically, customers with distributed generation (i.e., rooftop solar) reduce the amount of 
electricity they purchase from the grid but they still rely on the grid due to the intermittency of 
rooftop solar.  This implies that they pay less than their fair share for the system’s fixed costs 
while the utilities maintain their fixed costs for generation, transmission and distribution (Stanton, 
2013).  
Several studies have looked at the costs and benefits of distributed generation, and the 
role that state and federal incentives have played on accelerating renewable energy investments in 
the U.S. A study by Crago and Chernyakhovskiy (2014) studied the effectiveness of the state 
policies that incentivize solar PV adoption in the U.S. The results of their empirical analysis 
showed that policies (e.g., sales tax exemptions, income tax credits, loan financing programs and 
cash rebates) increase the capacity for solar PV, particularly the policies that are specifically 
targeting solar PV technology (Cai et al., 2013). Recent studies also showed that future residential 
load profiles are likely to decrease with the penetration of various technologies such as residential 
PV, combined heat and power, heat pump storage and electric vehicles (Veldman et al., 2013; 
Bediako et al., 2014).  Their scenario analysis showed that residential PV penetration is projected 
to grow and that future residential load profiles, particularly summer load profiles, will be 
significantly affected by distributed generation. Most of simulations in these studies have shown 
that the residential electricity demand is reduced with the adoption of various combinations of 
residential PV, combined heat and power, heat pump storage and electric vehicles technologies. 
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Increasing integration of these technologies is expected to increase the flexibility of the electric 
system (Bediako et al., 2014). Further, PV has one of the highest returns among other 
technologies without even considering the impact of policy incentives on distributed generation 
technologies (Vahl et al., 2013). Existing research has shown that residential electricity demand 
profile will change with increasing growth in distributed generation technologies (Veldman et al., 
2013; Darghouth et al., 2014) while the government continues to subsidize cleaner electricity 
generation. Studies in this literature focus primarily on the effectiveness of the incentives for 
residential solar development and the impact of distributed generation on the grid.  Current 
research has placed much less emphasis on the impact of solar integration on the utilities, which 
are still responsible for the transmission and distribution component of electric power to retail 
customers.  
In this chapter, I explore the implications of the integration of distributed generation on 
electricity demand at the residential sector and consider distributed generation as an endogenous 
factor that influences residential electricity demand.  This chapter extends the previous work on 
residential electricity demand by including on-site generation into the residential demand analysis 
and estimating price-responsiveness of the residential customers with increasing residential PV 
penetration. I also analyze the impact of the state policies (i.e., state NEM policy, state regulatory 
status) on residential PV capacity additions.  Finally, using the estimation results, I project future 
electricity sales to the residential sector considering various future PV penetration scenarios. This 
projection is potentially useful for utilities in their resource planning and rate making processes as 
they formally incorporate the expected reduction in residential electricity demand due to 
increased penetration of distributed generation. Utilities may also benefit from this analysis in 
terms of understanding the implications of different levels of PV penetrations for their revenues 
and financial viability.  
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3.1.1 Policy Background  
The U.S. share of solar generation has grown substantially with a 41% growth rate over the last 
year and has currently reached the total capacity of 17.5GW in the United States (SEIA, 2014). 
Solar installations have increased mostly due to the decline in the PV costs and state and federal 
incentives. The federal Solar Investment Tax Credits (SITC) program provides credits for 30 
percent of the qualified investment and installation costs for the residential taxpayer who owns 
solar panels (DSIRE 2014). The SITC policy has been in effect since 2006 and is set to expire in 
2016. Sener and Fthenakis (2014) note that solar tax credits have played an important role in the 
growth in solar investments in the US. Some states have formed Solar Renewable Energy 
Certificate (SREC) markets as an important feature of the Renewable Portfolio Standards, where 
electricity generated from PV can be traded separately from electricity as environmental attributes 
of renewable energy generated. A facility with 10kW capacity is able to generate approximately 
12 SRECs annually (SRECTrade, 2014). 
Another state program is Net Energy Metering (NEM), in which customers are given the 
option to pay only for the electricity that the customer purchases from the utility and allows the 
solar electricity generated on-site behind the retail meter to be used by the household or to be sold 
to the grid (SEIA, 2014a). Customers are billed for their net energy purchase from the utility and, 
in some cases, negative net balances can be carried forward to the next month’s bill (Arnette, 
2013; APPA, 2013). States vary considerably in the applications and regulations of their NEM 
policies and states may limit their generation capacity, eligible fuel type and total load for net 
metering (APPA, 2013).  
State regulatory status on retail competition may also indirectly influence the rate of 
residential PV integration. Restructured states are states that offer full retail competition, so that 
customers can choose to buy power from alternative electricity suppliers. In un-restructured 
states, customers buy power from their local utility and their electricity rates are set by the Public 
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Utility Commissions (PUCs). One could argue that a competitive market environment is more 
conducive to new distributed energy technologies to enter the market compared to a monopolized 
vertically integrated electricity market. Some studies have indeed shown that the adoption of 
rooftop solar is stimulated more in restructured states compared to the un-restructured states 
(Morse, 1997; Spratley, 1998; Martionot et al., 2005; Cai et al., 2013). However, retail 
competition may actually discourage customers from adopting distributed generation because 
customers in restructured states are able to choose the least expensive electricity provider. 
Investing in distributed generation may not then be a cost-effective option. Between 2000 and 
2012, restructured states had higher electricity prices than did un-restructured states (EIA, 
2014d).  See Appendix Figure 3.3. One then could argue that higher electricity prices may 
encourage residential customers to invest in rooftop solar, which allows these customers to 
generate their own electricity and reduce electricity purchases from the utility.  
3.2 Methods 
In this section, I provide a detailed explanation of the empirical model specification, including the 
justification for each of the variables included in the regression and the data used in the empirical 
analysis. 
3.2.1 Empirical Model Specification  
Most demand analyses of electricity consumption describes residential demand for an average 
customer as a function of electricity price, price of natural gas as a substitute for electricity, and 
demographic characteristics of the residential customers. Building on the underlying demand 
theory, I include capacity additions in residential distributed generation per customer (i.e., solar 
rooftop PV) into the residential electricity demand function. Below, I describe the system of 
equations and provide the rationale for the specification of the equations. . I then discuss which 
variables are endogenous and exogenous along with my estimation strategy 
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In the first equation, residential solar capacity installations per customer (lnPVt,s) is 
estimated as a function of state policies, the state’s solar energy resource, residential electricity 
price and cost of rooftop solar. I normalize the residential solar capacity installations using the 
total number of residential customers in a given state. First, I include the state policies that 
incentivize solar for the residential sector. One of the most comprehensive state level policy 
variables that encompasses various components of distributed generation (i.e., the capacity, 
eligibility, policy and metering issues) is the NEM policy. As an effectiveness measure of the 
NEM policy, each state is assigned a grade (i.e. grades A through F, where A is the highest grade) 
every year based on the state solar integration policy applications. This NEM Grade 
(NEMGradet,s)  is calculated by considering the capacity, eligibility, policy and metering issues 
(Freeing the Grid, 2014). More specifically, the index includes the largest system allowed on net 
metering, total program limits, metering provisions, eligible technologies and customers, 
renewable electricity credits ownership and third party financing (i.e. leasing). State NEM grades 
show reasonable variation; some states have improved their grades (e.g., OH, WA) while some 
states have fallen behind over time (e.g., FL, MI). I provide a summary table about the calculation 
of the NEM grade in Appendix Table 3.1. I expect that the states with higher NEM grades are 
associated with higher residential solar penetration.  Second, another state policy included to 
predict the PV capacity installations per customer is the state regulatory status on retail 
competition (Restructureds). Although the impact of state regulatory status is ambiguous, I 
expect that the states with restructured electricity markets would have higher solar penetration. 
Third, I include the residential price of electricity (lnPt,s
e ) as an explanatory variable. I expect that 
the residential solar penetration is likely to be higher when there are higher residential electricity 
prices. This could be explained by the idea that customers facing higher electricity prices have a 
greater incentive to generate their own electricity by adopting rooftop solar.  
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I include the monthly horizontal solar radiation (lnSolarRadt,s) as an explanatory 
variable for rooftop solar installations. I expect that the states with higher solar radiation have 
higher PV penetration per customer. I also consider the monthly variation of the cost per Watt of 
PV installations across the states and this ratio includes the average installation costs 
(lnAvrCostPVt,s) before tax incentives or cash rebates applied for solar PV for each state. I expect 
higher PV capacity installations with the lower costs of solar PV installations. I also include time 
dummies of month (Dm
month), and year (Dy
year
). Finally, some of the states in the sample (AZ, CA, 
CO, NJ, NV, PA, and WA) are categorized as early adopters because these states have longer 
history of PV capacity installations in the residential sector than the rest of the states. I expect that 
early adopting states have higher PV penetration per customer than later adopting states.   
Electricity price is the dependent variable in the second equation. The Public Utility Commission 
(PUC) is the public entity that sets the final retail rate for the residential sector and they set prices 
based on the marginal cost of electricity generation. I use the share of coal in the total generation 
mix (CoalSharet,s) and lagged electricity price (lnPt−1,s
e ) as explanatory variables. Finally, I 
include the predicted residential solar installations (𝐥𝐧𝐏𝐕𝐭,𝐬
∗ ) and expect that, with higher solar 
capacity installation per customer, the price of electricity will increase due to the lower electricity 
sales from the utility. Because the utility will meet its revenue requirement with lower sales, the 
electricity price needs to increase.   
The third equation explains the quantity of electricity demanded with the quantity of 
electricity consumed as the dependent variable. I estimate the residential electricity demand 
including the predicted values of residential electricity price (𝐥𝐧𝐏𝐭,𝐬
∗𝐞)  and the predicted residential 
solar installations (𝐥𝐧𝐏𝐕𝐭,𝐬
∗ ). I expect to find that the price of elasticity of electricity demand is 
negative for the residential customers. PV elasticity of electricity demand is also expected to be 
negative because with more solar capacity installations in the residential sector, more residential 
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customers generate their own electricity and the share of electricity provided from the utilities 
should decrease. Since outside temperature affects the electricity demand in the residential sector, 
I also include monthly average temperature in each state. I expect to find a positive relationship 
between monthly temperatures (lnTempt,s) and electricity demand. For example, residential 
electricity demand increases with higher outside temperatures during summer when residential 
customers extensively use their air conditioning. I include the natural gas price (lnPt,s
ng
)  as a 
substitute for electricity. A substantial number of residential customers use gas for heating their 
homes thus, when natural gas becomes an expensive energy source, residential electricity demand 
increases.  
I include socioeconomic variables such as monthly disposable income for each state. 
Households with higher disposable income may use more electricity because they often own 
various electric appliances (TV, dishwasher, washer and dryer) that consume electricity. On the 
other hand, they may have more energy efficient appliances and homes and this may dampen 
their electricity consumption. The net effect can be determined empirically. Finally, I control for 
the electricity demand reduction due to energy efficiency programs, which have had an important 
impact on the electricity demand management at the residential sector. Thus, I include states’ 
energy efficiency scores as reported by the American Council for Energy Efficient Economy 
(ACEEE) in order to control for the state performance on energy management. States with higher 
energy efficiency score (lnACEEEScores) are expected to have lower electricity demand per 
residential customer. The system of equations for residential electricity demand is provided here, 
and Table 3.1 summarizes the description of the variables used in the empirical analysis.  
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lnPVt,s = α0 + α1NEMgradet,s + α2Restructureds + α3Pt,s
e + α4lnSolarRadt,s + α4lnAvrCostPVt,s
+  α5EarlyPVAdopters + Dy
year
+ Dm
month + ε1,t,s                                                             (3.1) 
lnPt,s
e
= β0 + β1CoalSharet,s + β2lnPt−1,s
e + 𝛃𝟑𝐥𝐧𝐏𝐕𝐭,𝐬
∗ + β4EarlyPVAdopters + Dy
year
+ Dm
month
+ ε2,t,s                                                                                                                                                                             (3.2) 
 
Et,s = θ0 + 𝛉𝟏𝐥𝐧𝐏𝐭,𝐬
𝐞∗ + θ2𝐥𝐧𝐏𝐕𝐭,𝐬
∗ + θ3lnPt,s
ng
+ θ4lnTempt,s + θ5Restructureds +  θ6lnIncomet,s
+  θ7lnACEEEScores + θ8EarlyPVAdopters +  Dy
year
+ D𝑚
month
+ ε3,t,s                                                                                                                                           (3.3) 
 
The endogenous variables in this system of equations are residential solar capacity 
installations (lnPVt,s), residential retail electricity price (lnPt,s
e ) and residential electricity demand 
per customer (lnEt,s). Residential solar PV capacity and residential electricity demand depends in 
part on the residential retail electricity price (lnPt,s
e ). Because of this endogeneity, the price 
equation is identified using instrumental variables of share of coal13 (CoalSharet,s) and lagged 
electricity price (lnPt−1,s
e ). Coal is often used as base load generation and it is a relatively cheaper 
fuel than natural gas or diesel oil. An increase in the share of coal in electricity generation would 
reduce electricity prices due to using relatively cheaper input for generation, which would 
ultimately increase residential electricity demanded. Coal share in the monthly generation mix 
can only affect electricity demanded through the price of electricity, which is only determined by 
the shift in electricity supply. I expect to find a strong positive relationship between the electricity 
price and the monthly lagged electricity price due to stability of price setting by the PUC.   
 
                                                 
13 Natural gas share could be good instrument but it is not included into the analysis because of high 
correlation (See Appendix Figure 3.2) 
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Table 3. 1: Description of the Variables 
Variable Description  Unit Notation  
Solar Capacity PV Capacity Installations per 
Residential Customer 
MW/Customer PVt,s 
Electricity Price  Real Average Residential Electricity 
Price (All-in) 
Cents/kWh Pt,s
e  
Electricity Demand  Real Monthly Residential Electricity 
Sales per Customer 
MWh/Customer Et,s 
Solar Radiation Aggregate Horizontal Solar 
Radiation by State 
Wh/m2 SolarRadt,s 
NEM Grade Net Energy Metering Grade by State 
(=1 if grade is A; otherwise grade is 
0) 
Binary variable NEMgradet,s 
Cost of Solar Monthly per watt cost of PV by state 
before incentives applied (max 5kW) 
$/Watt AvrCostPVt,s 
Restructured State Regulatory Status 1 if 
restructured; 2 
if suspended; 0 
otherwise; 
Restructureds 
Coal Share Share of Coal in Electricity 
Generation (%) 
Amount of 
Coal/Total Fuel 
CoalSharet,s 
NG Price  Real Residential Natural Gas Price $/𝑓𝑡3 Pt,s
ng
 
Temperature Monthly Average Temperature ℉ Tempt,s 
ACEEE Score The state energy efficiency ranking State rankings 
range from 1 to 
50. Higher 
score indicates 
better energy 
efficiency 
ACEEEScore 
Disposable Income Monthly Disposable Income per 
Customer by State 
Levels Income𝑠,𝑡 
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I use three stage least squares (3SLS) method to estimate the system of equations. The model 
specification is also consistent with the assumptions that the error term is not correlated with the 
exogenous variables in the model Cov(εi,t,s|Xi,s,t) = 0, where Xs,t represents the exogenous 
variables on the right hand-side of each equation, i represents the number of equations (i =
1,2,3), s represents the states and t represents each month (t = 1 … T), taking into account cross-
equation correlation of error. The instrumental variables Zs,t are also highly correlated with the 
endogenous variable, industrial electricity price (lnPs,t), and uncorrelated with the error term εt,s 
(Cov (Ps,t, zs,t) ≠ 0 and Cov (εs,t, zs,t) = 0) (Wooldridge 2011, 247). I test these assumptions in 
the Results section. In Table 3.2, I summarize the expected sign from each independent variable 
and my hypotheses for the stated expected impacts.  
3.3 Data 
 
Empirical analysis focuses on the period between 2008 and 2012 because of the substantial 
increase in residential PV capacity installation has been within this period (See Appendix Figure 
3.2). There are 23 states with data on residential PV penetration14. Ten of them are restructured, 
eight are un-restructured and five have suspended restructuring. Restructured states included in 
the analysis are Texas, Illinois, Oregon, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, Maryland, Delaware, 
New Jersey and Massachusetts. Un-restructured states included in the analysis are Arizona, 
California, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, North Carolina, New Mexico, Nevada, Utah, Virginia, 
Vermont and Washington (EIA, 2010)15. Nevada has the highest and Georgia has the lowest 
average PV capacity installations per customer. The average quantity of annual electricity sales 
per customer is approximately 954 kWh and the average residential electricity price is  
                                                 
14 States in the sample: AZ, CA, CO, DE, FL, GA, IL, IN, MA,MD, NC, NJ, NM, NV, NY, OH, OR, PA, 
TX, UT, VT, WA.  
15 Other restructured states in the US (Michigan, Connecticut, Maine and New Hampshire) are eliminated 
from the analysis because of not having sufficient data points on the residential PV capacity installations.  
  71 
Table 3. 2: Hypotheses on the Coefficient Estimates 
Estimated Equation Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
Hypothesis 
Equation 1 
Solar Capacity  
Electricity Price + 
Increase in electricity price 
increases PV penetration 
  
Solar Radiation  + 
With higher solar radiation, 
PV penetration increases  
  
NEM Grade + 
States with higher NEM 
grade have higher PV 
penetration  
  
Cost of Solar  - 
With lower solar PV costs, 
PV capacity installations 
increases  
  
Restructured  + 
Restructured states have 
higher PV penetration  
Equation 2 
Electricity Price  
Coal Share - 
Increase in share of coal in 
the generation mix decreases 
price of electricity  
 
Lagged Electricity 
Price 
+ 
Increase in previous month’s 
price increases price of 
electricity  
  
Solar Capacity  - 
Increase in residential PV 
capacity installations 
decreases price of electricity  
Equation 3 
Electricity Demand  
Electricity Price - 
Increase in electricity price 
decreases electricity 
demanded 
  
Solar Capacity - 
Increase in PV penetration 
decreases electricity demand  
  
NG Price + 
Increase in natural gas prices 
increases electricity demand 
(substitution effect) 
  
Temperature + 
With higher temperatures, 
electricity demand decreases 
  
ACEEE Score - 
With higher energy 
efficiency score, residential 
demand decreases 
  
Disposable Income + 
With higher disposable 
income, residential 
electricity demand increases 
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12cents/kWh. The highest monthly average quantity of residential electricity sales per customer is 
in North Carolina (1,1592kWh/customer), where the residential electricity price is 11.8 
cents/kWh. Restructured states have higher average monthly electricity prices. Further, all 
restructured states, with the exception of Texas, have NEM grades higher than “C”. I compare the 
monthly average residential electricity prices for restructured and un-restructured states in 
Appendix Figure 3.3 and Appendix Table 3.3 lists states and their NEM grades.   
I obtain monthly residential electricity sales and residential PV capacity installations data 
from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) monthly electric power database, solar 
radiation data from National Renewable Energy Laboratory’s Solar Database, Net Energy 
Metering (NEM) grades from the Solar Energy Industry Association, and temperature data from 
Midwest Regional Climate Center. Residential electricity price is the average all-in electricity 
price offered by the utilities to residential customers in each state and residential electricity sales 
is the average monthly electricity consumption per residential customer in each state. Utilities 
report the monthly PV capacity installations for the residential sector and I use the aggregated 
monthly capacity by state between 2008 and 2012. State regulatory status data is again obtained 
from the EIA. NREL Solar data provides the monthly aggregate horizontal solar radiation for 
multiple stations in each state between 1990 and 2010. (See Appendix Table 3.4 for the list of 
data sources) Since this study goes through 2012, I applied linear extrapolation16 for the years 
2011 and 2012. I aggregate the solar radiation for each month by state. The share of coal in 
electricity generation mix and the residential natural gas prices are also obtained from the EIA. I 
obtain the cost of PV data from the Open PV project by National Renewable Energy Laboratory 
(NREL), in which the solar rooftop installers report the total number of installations, cost per 
Watt ($/Watt) and the capacity of the technology installed (MW). I only include the residential 
                                                 
16 I use “Ipolate” command with epolate option in Stata to conduct the linear extrapolation. I have sufficient 
historical data points to do the extrapolation.  
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PV installed up to 5kW into the regression, which is approximately the maximum of residential 
capacity installed in the US. Finally, I used GDP deflator by each state to eliminate the inflation 
over time on electricity price and natural gas prices to correct for inflation. Table 3.3 shows the 
summary statistics.  
Table 3. 3: Descriptive Statistics 
   Quantiles 
Variable Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
Solar Capacity 
(MW/Customer) 
36.36 71.1 0 2.41 12.5 37.35 635.22 
Electricity Price 
(cents/kWh) 
11.68 5.08 6.17 8.9 10.11 12.39 42.63 
Electricity Demand 
(MWh/Customer) 
1.48 5.32 0.45 0.67 0.85 1.12 71.18 
Solar Radiation 
(Wh/m2) 
71,690 69,843 2,972 30,131 55,400 84,891 550,000 
NEM Grade 0.22 0.42 0 0 0 0 1 
Cost of Solar 
($/Watt) 
7.33 2.44 0 6 7.15 8.39 51.99 
Restructured (binary) 0.43 0.5 0 0 0 1 1 
Coal Share (%) 0.28 0.31 0 0.03 0.15 0.48 1 
NG Price ($/𝑓𝑡3) 14.76 6.59 6.53 10.4 13.6 17.07 60.72 
Temperature (℉) 53.76 16.38 10.9 40.7 54.3 67.2 88.2 
ACEEE Score (levels) 24.45 9.33 3 18.5 22 30 45.5 
Disposable Income (levels) 18.8 1.04 16.05 17.92 18.83 19.61 21.44 
3.4 Results  
3.4.1 Estimation Findings  
In the first equation, residential solar capacity installations equation, I find that residential PV 
capacity installations are about 0.07% higher with higher NEM grades (i.e., grade A relative to 
B). Compared to the un-restructured states, restructured states have about 3.5% higher residential 
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PV capacity installations. I also find that 1% increase in the residential electricity price is 
associated with about 0.11% increase in residential PV capacity installations. I find that with 1% 
higher horizontal solar radiation increases residential PV capacity installations per customer by 
about 1.13%. With a percent lower total cost of PV installations before the financial incentives 
increases the residential PV capacity installations by about 0.14%. State regulatory status (i.e. 
restructured vs. un-restructured) and solar source variables are statistically significant at 1% 
significance level and have the expected coefficient signs.  
All of the coefficients of the year dummies are positive and statistically significant. It 
means that compared to year 2008, residential PV capacity installations have increased over time. 
For example, capacity installations are about 0.7% higher in 2009 and 3.7% higher in 2012 
compared to year 2008. Compared to January, PV capacity additions are significantly higher 
during September through December. Predicted coefficients for month dummies are all positive 
but statistically not significant except for the months September through December.  
In the second equation, the residential electricity price equation, I find that the residential 
customers respond to the price changes in the previous month’s bill. A 1% increase in electricity 
price in the previous month increases the expectations on the current electricity price by 0.94%. 
Further, a 1% increase in share of coal in the generation mix, decreases the electricity price by 
about 0.5%. These instruments are statistically significant, which is also an indicator of an 
appropriate instrument for the price equation. Also, a 1% in the predicted residential PV capacity 
installations per customer increases the electricity price by about 0.04% and it is statistically 
significant. Residential electricity prices (i.e. real prices) are lower over time compared to the 
prices in 2008. Residential price is about 0.06% lower in 2009; 0.15% lower in 2010; 
significantly 0.27% lower in 2011 and 0.28% lower 2012 compared to the prices in 2008. The 
residential electricity price is higher during December, February and March compared to the 
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residential prices in January but the prices are lower in other months compared to January. 
However, monthly dummies are statistically insignificant.  
In the third equation, the residential electricity demand equation, I find that a 1% increase 
in electricity price per customer is associated with about 0.15% decrease in residential electricity 
demanded per customer. Further, a 1% increase in residential PV capacity installations per 
customer is associated with about 0.03% decrease in residential electricity demand per customer. 
Also, an increase in the natural gas price, the substitute fuel for electricity, increases electricity 
demand by 0.2%. Residential electricity demand per customer increases by about 0.4% if the 
outside temperature increases by one percent. With 1% higher disposable income, electricity 
demand per customer is 0.11% higher. States with higher ACEEE energy efficiency score have 
lower residential electricity demand per customer by about 0.14% but this impact is not 
statistically significant. Residential electricity demand per customer has slightly increased over 
time compared to the residential demand per customer in 2008. Residential demand per customer 
is about 0.07% higher in 2009; 0.15% higher in 2010; 0.20% higher in 2011 and 0.14% higher in 
2012 compared to the electricity demand per customer in 2008, and the increase relative to year 
2008 is statistically significant. Residential electricity demand per customer in each month is 
significantly lower compared to residential electricity demand per customer on January, which is 
typically the coldest month when the demand for electricity is the highest compared to the other 
months. In Table 3.4, I present the summary of the regression statistics and the regression results 
of the Three Stage Least Squares estimations. 
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Table 3. 4: 3SLS Monthly Regression Summary and Regression Results 
Equation Observations Parameters RMSE R-square F-Stat P-Val 
1st  Stage 523 27 0.817738 0.8059 76.28 0.0001 
2nd Stage 523 25 0.222399 0.9422 324.8 0.0001 
3rd Stage 523 28 0.193129 0.6556 34.34 0.0001 
    
Equation 1  
Solar 
Capacity  Estimation  T-stat  
Equation 2  
Electricity 
Price  Estimation  T-stat  
Equation 3 
Electricity 
Demand Estimation  T-stat  
Solar 
Radiation 
1.131*** -10.73 
Lagged 
Electricity Price 
0.939*** -47.31 Electricity Price -0.146*** -4.35 
Cost of Solar -0.136 -0.56 Coal Share -0.467*** -6.09 Solar Capacity -0.032 -1.61 
NEM Grade 0.067 -1.59 Solar Capacity 0.040** -2.46 NG price 0.237*** -4.78 
Restructured 1.085*** -7.16 Constant 0.231 -0.7 Temperature 0.370*** -4.68 
Electricity 
Price 
0.109 -1.32 year2009 -0.055 -1.38 ACEEE Score -0.144*** -5.09 
Constant -27.635*** -16.94 year2010 -0.151*** -3.33 
Disposable 
Income 
0.109** -2.32 
year2009 0.691*** -4.84 year2011 -0.270*** -4.81 Constant -2.475*** -4.74 
year2010 1.615*** -11.51 year2012 -0.278*** -3.8 year2009 0.072* -1.94 
year2011 2.635*** -17.56 month2 0.01 -0.21 year2010 0.154*** -3.25 
year2012 3.707*** -22.78 month3 -0.003 -0.05 year2011 0.201*** -3.2 
month2 -0.301* -1.68 month4 -0.011 -0.23 year2012 0.144* -1.79 
month3 -0.653*** -3.42 month5 -0.029 -0.6 month2 -0.167*** -3.95 
month4 -0.787*** -4.09 month6 -0.043 -0.88 month3 -0.328*** -6.79 
month5 -0.933*** -4.63 month7 -0.036 -0.74 month4 -0.507*** -9.59 
month6 -0.865*** -4.25 month8 -0.038 -0.8 month5 -0.508*** -8.45 
month7 -0.790*** -3.94 month9 -0.032 -0.64 month6 -0.359*** -5.4 
month8 -0.588*** -3.05 month10 -0.034 -0.7 month7 -0.147** -2.07 
month9 -0.281 -1.48 month11 -0.03 -0.61 month8 -0.184*** -2.66 
month10 0.308* -1.74 month12 0.011 -0.23 month9 -0.312*** -4.83 
month11 0.522*** -2.92 dumAZ -0.077 -1.43 month10 -0.436*** -8.05 
month12 0.998*** -5.68 dumCA -0.082** -2 month11 -0.398*** -8.43 
dumAZ 0.492** -2.18 dumCO 0.045 -0.79 month12 -0.062 -1.45 
dumCA -1.980*** -5.85 dumNJ -0.156*** -3.06 dumAZ 0.296*** -5.9 
dumCO 2.562*** -12.27 dumNV -0.182** -2.37 dumCA -0.128** -2.09 
dumNJ 2.495*** -13.09 dumPA 0.039 -1.02 dumCO 0.119** -1.99 
dumNV 2.505*** -11.91 dumWA 0.2 -0.87 dumNJ -0.254*** -5.07 
dumPA -0.680*** -4.46    dumNV 0.282*** -3.91 
dumWA -1.813** -2.13    dumPA 0.076** -2.04 
      dumWA 0.624*** -3.09 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.1  ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
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Using the output from the regression analysis, I can compute the price elasticity of 
residential electricity demand and PV elasticity residential electricity demand. Price elasticity of 
electricity demand can be defined as follows:   
φ =
δElecSalesperCustomer
δRealPrice
∙
RealPrice
ElecSalesperCustomer
. 
This model specification is in log-log form and I can directly obtain φ from the third 
stage of the estimation φ =
δlnElecSalesperCustomer
δlnRealPrice
. The estimated price elasticity of demand is -
0.146 and it is statistically significant at the 1% significance level. This estimate is consistent 
with the electricity price estimates based on the previous literature. See Appendix Table 3.2. 
Residential PV elasticity of demand, responsiveness of the residential demand to PV penetration, 
can also be directly obtained from the third-stage. Residential PV elasticity of demand can be 
computed as 
ρ = 
δElecSalesperCustomer
δTotalPVcapacityperCustomer
∙
TotalPVcapacityperCustomer
ElecSalesperCustomer
. 
Similarly, I can directly obtain 𝜌 =
δlnElecSalesperCustomer
δlnTotalPVcapacityperCustomer
 from the third-stage of 
the regression. The parameter is not statistically significant but it is at 11% level. 
These elasticity values indicate that 1% increase in the residential electricity price, electricity 
sales per customer decreases by 0.146% and an additional for 1% increase in residential solar PV 
capacity installations per customer, electricity sales per customer decreases by about 0.03%. I 
present the elasticity estimates in Table 3.5.  All of the standard errors in the regression results 
and standards errors for the elasticity estimations are bootstrapped.  
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Table 3. 5: Elasticity Estimates 
Elasticity  Coeff. Std.Err z P>z Confidence Interval 
Price Elasticity of 
Demand φ 
-0.15 0.03 -4.35 0.0001 -0.211 -0.08 
PV elasticity of 
Demand 𝜌 
-0.03 0.03 -1.61 0.107 -0.070 0.007 
 
Finally, I test whether there is correlation among the error terms in the simultaneous 
equations and there is no significant evidence of high correlation among the error terms within 
the system. Rank and order conditions in the system are met and the system of equations is 
correctly identified. I also test the validity of the instruments: 1) included instruments are 
independent of the error term and 2) included instruments are sufficiently correlated with the 
endogenous variables. I check the goodness-of-fit test for the second stage in order to check the 
whether the excluded instruments are sufficiently correlated with the endogenous variable. The F 
statistics results are statistically significant (F-test statistic 324.8; p-value 0.0001) indicating that 
the equation is not weakly identified. Since all of these test statistics are valid under the i.i.d and 
homoscedasticity assumption, I check for the overall system heteroscedasticity testing the null 
hypothesis of no overall heteroscedasticity and the LR test statistics fail to reject the null 
hypothesis (LR Test 9.2932; p-value 0.0256). I also check the diagonal covariance matrix using 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier statistic (Shehata, 2011; Shehata, 2012) which shows that 
3SLS is a better specification than OLS. Thus, I reject the null hypothesis of independent 
equation in simultaneous equation system (LM Test statistic 8.55905, p-value 0.0221).   
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3.4.2 Application of the Empirical Findings  
 
I use the estimated elasticity values and project the share of the utility electricity sales reduction 
of the total sales to residential sector between 2013 and 2020. I assume that 5%, 10%, 15%, 20% 
and 25% of the residential customers have rooftop PV by 2020. I conduct a simulation for a 
representative state, where there has been considerable amount of residential PV penetration 
between 2008 and 2012 (SEIA 2014b). The average residential PV capacity installed by 86MW 
and the average electricity price is 11cents/kWh between 2008 and 2012. Further, the average 
monthly residential electricity consumption per customer is approximately 1000kWh. The 
representative state has a successful Net Energy Metering policy. In other words, it the highest 
NEM grade of “A” in 2012. In Table 3.6, I provide summary statistics for the representative state.  
Table 3. 6: Summary Statistics for the Representative State 
 Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
Solar Capacity 
(MW/ Customer) 86 157 4 9 9 44 635 
Electricity Price 
(cents/kWh) 11 0 10 11 11 11 12 
Residential Sales 
(MWh/Customer) 1.1 0.4 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.4 1.8 
 
The simulation procedure I conducted is as follows:  
 I first obtain the total system peak demand (MW) and number of residential customers for 
the representative state between 2008 and 2012 from Energy Information Administration 
(EIA). Assuming that approximately 30% of the total customers are residential customers, 
I calculate residential peak demand.  
 I calculate the average annual growth in residential peak demand and project forward the 
peak demand through 2020 using the calculated growth rate and I calculate residential peak 
demand per customer by scaling the demand with the number of residential customers.  
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 Assuming a 5, 10, 15, 20 and 25 percent of number of residential customers with PV by 
2020, I calculate the average annual growth rate to achieve these assumed projected 
residential PV penetration levels.  
 I then apply the elasticity values along with the calculated annual PV penetration growth 
rates for each scenario. Based on the empirical analysis, I find that a percent increase in 
residential PV installations decreases electricity demand per customer by about 0.032%. 
For example, if the projected PV installations increase by 3%, projected residential 
electricity demand per customer are expected to diminish by about 0.096% (0.03*0.032).  
 Finally, I multiply the projected residential demand per customer with the total number of 
customer to obtain the aggregate impact of the reduction in residential demand due to PV 
penetration under different penetration scenarios.   
These projections show that electricity sales to the residential customer in the 
representative state decrease. For example, in a 25% residential PV penetration scenario by 2020, 
about 1.2% of the projected growth of the electricity sales to the residential customers will be 
taken over by rooftop solar. Figure 9 shows the share of the residential sales reduction in the total 
residential sales.  
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Figure 3. 1: Projected Electricity Sales per Customer 
3.5 Discussion and Policy Implications  
 
Distributed generation technologies used to be perceived as expensive and uncertain source of 
electricity. However, with the steep decrease in the distributed generation technology costs and 
the availability of various financing options and policy incentives, the penetration of these 
technologies have substantially increased over the past decade (Hyde and Komor, 2014; 
Burkhardt et al., 2015). Consumer-owned PV penetration has been currently one of the fastest 
growing distributed generation sources in the residential sector (Cai et al. 2013). In fact, a 
McKinsey study estimates that by 2020 the distributed PV capacity may reach 193 MW by 2020, 
representing 19 percent of the U.S. generating capacity projected by EIA in 2020. Therefore, it is 
essential to understand the impact of increased DG penetration on the electricity sales as it has 
direct consequences for the future of electric utility business model. 
Growth of electricity demand has slowed in each decade since the 1950s, from 9.8% per 
year from 1949 to 1959 to only 0.7% per year since 2000. In the Annual Energy Outlook 2014 
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Reference Case, electricity demand growth remains relatively low (projected at 0.9% per year), as 
rising demand for electric services is offset by efficiency gains from new appliance standards and 
investments in energy-efficient equipment.  The sales growth rate is expected to decline further 
with the increasing residential PV penetration due to falling solar panel prices, favorable net 
energy metering policies, and rising electricity prices. With more residential PV penetration, 
electricity demand of the residential customers decreases and is projected to decrease at 
increasing rates in the next decade. Although the application of Net Energy Metering (NEM) is 
different at each state including capacity limits, metering issues and eligible customers and 
technologies, these policies contribute to the growth in residential PV capacity installations. Also, 
expiration of the federal tax credits for wind will also make solar more attractive and cost-
effective renewable energy resource (Arnette, 2013). Further, restructured states, where retail 
prices are higher compared to the un-restructured states, are predicted to have higher residential 
PV capacity installations. Thus, state retail competition is also an important driver of the 
distributed generation at the residential sector.  
Increasing share of the solar generation by the residential customers have several benefits 
to the customers, to electric grid and to the environment. First, there are no emissions associated 
with producing energy from solar. Second, the marginal cost of producing solar is also zero, in 
addition to the rapidly decreasing investment costs (Brown and Bunyan, 2014). There are also 
additional benefits of increasing PV penetration such as demand response, although the empirical 
analysis does not directly consider the relationship between distributed generation and demand 
response.     
Despite various benefits of increased residential solar PV penetration, increasing number 
of residential customers with distributed generation has increased the concerns of the utilities that 
serve to these customers (Costello and Hemphill, 2014). This is mainly because a higher 
penetration of residential sales implies lower sales for electric utilities, which still have to recover 
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their revenue requirements to be able to sustain reliable and affordable service.  Utilities in 
regions with high PV penetration. Utilities in regions with high PV penetration such as Arizona 
and California have already started to consider redesigning their rates (Jannson and 
Michaelfelder, 2008; Carson and Davis, 2014). For instance, Arizona’s largest electric utility 
company, Arizona Public Service Company (APS) designed experimental net metering plans, 
which includes additional fixed charges, $0.70/kW for the residential rooftop owners. Similarly, 
PG&E, California’s largest utility charges between $4-5/month to all residential customers, in 
addition to the fixed NEM fee for the residential rooftop PV owners (Carson and Davis, 2014). 
With increased fixed charges, or three part tariffs, the customers who choose to adopt residential 
PVs will pay their fair share of the costs imposed on the system. 
The analysis in this essay can be used by utilities to simulate the sales impact of increased 
residential PV penetration in their service territories and understand the implications for their 
revenue requirements.  Having projected the potential revenue scenarios, they can more readily 
plan for future investments, rate-design initiatives, integrated resources plans and other 
operational functions.       
3.6 Conclusions  
 
This essay empirically analyzes the impact of residential rooftop solar on residential electricity 
demand. The model includes system of equations and predicts residential electricity demand 
using three-stage least squares estimation method. In the first stage, I predict the residential PV 
capacity installations controlling for the state policies, state solar resource and market variables. 
In the second stage, I estimate residential electricity price using instrumental variables. In the 
third stage, I predict the residential electricity demand simultaneously estimating the system of 
equations. Using the estimation results, I compute the price elasticity of demand and residential 
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PV capacity installations of demand. This analysis concludes with projecting the utility sales to 
the residential customers with solar generation using the elasticity estimates.  
I have several data limitations and this study could significantly be improved by 
overcoming these limitations. One of the major limitations is the sufficient data points on 
monthly residential PV capacity installations for several states. I had to exclude a number of 
states from the empirical analysis. Another data limitation is that I was not able to identify the 
variation across the states in terms of state performance on federal incentives. For example, I 
could not retrieve any time series data on the level of residential PV capacity installations 
incentivized by the federal credits at the state level. This could disaggregate the policies for 
residential PV penetration and quantify the impact of the federal subsidies on the residential PV 
penetration, in addition to the state policies.   
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4. Conclusions  
 
The objective of this dissertation is to analyze the economics of renewable electricity generation 
from wind and solar and the adoption of demand response in the electricity markets.  
First chapter includes solving a particular wind investment model considering the uncertainties 
about the future of the PTC policy and the stochastic REC prices. The solution of this 
optimization model includes finding a profitability threshold for investment in a small scale 
merchant wind development project. I find that the REC threshold is lower with the PTC policy. I 
also show that the investment decision is sensitive to the level of uncertainty about the PTC 
incentive and the REC prices. Higher uncertainty in the PTC policy increases the REC price 
threshold for the investment in wind energy. This chapter contributes to an understanding of how 
the uncertainties in these policies will impact future wind investments over the next 20 years. 
Second chapter hypothesizes that there are regional differences in price-responsiveness 
for industrial sector both in retail and wholesale electricity markets in the MISO region. The 
empirical analysis employed in this chapter aims to create a discussion on the connection between 
the retail electricity market, in which industrial consumers often purchase electricity through 
relatively flat retail rates, and the wholesale electricity market, where market participants are able 
to change their electricity transactions based on real-time price changes. Price responsiveness is 
strongest in sub-regions where long-term industrial retail price-responsiveness is highest (i.e. 
Michigan and, to a lesser extend Minnesota). Results also suggest that generation and distribution 
utilities transacting at the wholesale level are able to respond in modest ways to real-time price 
changes, even without the demand-pull of a price-informed retail market.   
In third chapter, residential electricity demand is estimated considering fast growing 
distributed generation resource, residential rooftop solar that affects demand for electricity at the 
residential sector, and ultimately affects utility revenues. The analysis in this chapter can be used 
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by utilities to simulate the sales impact of increased residential PV penetration in their service 
territories and understand the implications for their revenue requirements.  Having projected the 
potential revenue scenarios, utilities can more readily plan for future investments, rate-design 
initiatives, integrated resources plans and other operational functions.       
In sum, this dissertation contributes to the understanding of the impact of policy on 
electricity generation from renewable resources such as wind and solar. It provides an 
understanding of the implications of industrial customer responsiveness in different states on the 
wholesale market and state-monitored demand response adoption across the MISO region. First 
chapter in this dissertation could be expanded study by looking at the impact of uncertainty in 
state and federal policy on wind energy investments in conjunction with the heterogeneity in wind 
turbines and employ empirical methods to demonstrate the impact of the uncertainty around the 
PTC on the historical investments in the US. Also, future research is needed to build improved 
understanding of industrial customers in different sectors and explore industrial price 
responsiveness and adoption of demand response across state regulatory and regional market 
governance environments. The empirical approach in second chapter could be considerably 
improved with more granular consumer-level data. Finally, future research may focus on the 
environmental implications on renewable electricity generation and the adoption of demand 
response. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  87 
5. Bibliography 
 
1. Alberini, A., Filippini, M. (2011). Response of Residential Electricity Demand to Price: The 
Effect of Measurement Error. Journal of Energy Economics, 33(5), 889-895.   
2. Alcott, H. (2011). Rethinking Real-Time Electricity Pricing. Journal of Resource and 
Environmental Economics, 33(4), 820-842.   
3. Alcott, H. (2009). Real-Time Pricing and Electricity Markets (White Paper at Harvard 
University). Cambridge, MA. Retrieved March 11, 2015, from 
https://files.nyu.edu/ha32/public/research.html.  
4. American Public Power Association. (2013). Distributed Generation: An Overview of Recent 
Policy and Market Developments (Technical Report). Retrieved March 28, 2014, from 
http://www.publicpower.org/files/PDFs/Distributed%20Generation-Nov2013.pdf  
5. American Wind Energy Association. (2013). Wind Energy Fact at a Glance. Retrieved from 
https://www.awea.org/Resources/Content.aspx?ItemNumber=5059.    
6. Arnette, A.N. (2013). Integrating Rooftop Solar into Multi-Source Energy Planning 
Optimization Model. Journal of Applied Energy, 111(2013), 456-467. 
7. Arrow, K. J., Fischer, A. C. (1974). Environmental Preservation, Uncertainty and Preservation. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 88(2), 312-319. 
8. Asare-Bediako, B., King, W.L., Ribeiro, P.F. (2014). Future Residential Load Profile: Scenario-
based Analysis of High Penetration of Heavy Loads and Distributed Generation. Journal of 
Energy and Buildings, 75(2014), 228-238.  
9. Balikcioglu, M., Fackler, P.L., Pindyck, R.S. (2011). Solving Optimal Timing Problems in 
Environmental Economics. Journal of Resource and Energy Economics, 33(3), 761-768. 
10. Barradale, M.J. (2010). Impact of Public policy Uncertainty on Renewable Energy 
Investment: Wind Power and Production Tax Credit. Journal of Energy Policy, 38(12), 7698-
  88 
7709. 
11. Bernstein, M.A., Griffin, J. (2006). Regional Differences in the Price-Elasticity of Demand 
for Energy (Technical Report). Rand Corporation. Retrieved from 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2005/RAND_TR292.pdf  
12. Bharvirkar, R., Goldman, C., Heffner, G., Sedano, R. (2008). Coordination of Retail Demand 
Response with Midwest ISO Wholesale Markets (Technical Report).  Ernest Orlando 
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. 
13. Blanco, C., Choi, S., Soronow, D. (2001). Energy Price Processes: Used for Derivatives 
Pricing and Risk Management. Commodities Now: Energy Pricing, March 2001. Retrieved 
March 23, 2013, www.fea.com/.../a_jump_diffusion_processes.pdf.   
14. Bodily, S, Del Buono, M. (2002). Risk and reward at the speed of light: a new electricity 
price model. Cutting Edge: Electricity Prices, pages 62-71. Retrieved September 9, 2013, 
www.risk.net/data/eprm/pdf/september/technical.pdf. 
15. Bohi, D.R., Zimmerman, M. B. (1984). An Update on Econometric Studies of Energy 
Demand Behavior. Journal of Annual Review of Energy, 9, 105-154.   
16. Bohi D.R., Palmer, K.L. (1996). The Efficiency of Wholesale vs. Retail Competition in 
Electricity. The Electricity Journal, 9(8), 12-20. 
17. Borchers, A. M., Xiarchos, I., Beckman, J. (2014). Determinants of Wind and Solar Energy 
System Adoption by US Farms: A Multilevel Modeling Approach. Journal of Energy Policy, 
69, 106-115. 
18. Borenstein, S. (2005). The Long-run Efficiencies of Real Time Pricing (Revised Working 
Paper). University of California Energy Institute, Center for the Study of Energy Markets. 
Retrieved from https://www.aeaweb.org/assa/2005/0108_1015_1102.pdf  
19. Brown, P. (2012). US Renewable Electricity: How Does the Production Tax Credit (PTC) 
Impact Wind Markets? (CRS Report for Congress). Washington D.C.: Congressional 
  89 
Research Service. Retrieved December 24, 2012, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42576.pdf.    
20. Brown, A., Bunyan, J. (2014). Valuation of Distributed Solar: A Qualitative View. The 
Electricity Journal, 27(10), 27-47.  
21. Burkhardt, J., Wiser, R., Darghouth, N., Dong, C.G., Huneycutt, J. (2015). Exploring the 
Impact of Permitting and Local Regulatory Processes on Residential Solar Prices in the United 
States. Journal of Energy Policy, 78, 102-108.  
22. Cai, D.W.H., Adlakha, S., Low, S. H., DeMartini, P. (2013). Impact of Residential PV 
Adoption on Retail Electricity Rates. Journal of Energy Policy, 62, 830-843.  
23. Cappers, P., Goldman, C., Kathan, D. (2010). Demand Response in U.S. Electricity Markets: 
Empirical Evidence. Journal of Energy, 35(4), 1526-1535. 
24. Carson, E., Davis, E.  Utilities Nationwide Adjust Rate Designs to Meet Changing Customer 
Demand: Increasing Levels of Residential Solar PV Leading to New Customer Rate Policies 
(Policy Brief). Enerknol Research. Retrieved from January 28, 2015, http://enerknol.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/12/EnerKnol-Research-Utility-Rate-Design-Reform-12.15.14.pdf. 
25. Caves, D., Eakin, K.  Faruqui, A. (2000). Mitigating Price Spikes in Wholesale Markets 
through Market-Based Pricing in Retail Markets. The Electricity Journal, 13(3), 1-21. 
26. Center for Energy Economics. (2009). Lessons Learned from Renewable Energy Credit 
(REC) Trading in Texas (Research Report). Prepared for State Energy Conservation Office 
Texas. Retrieved November 11, 2014, 
http://www.beg.utexas.edu/energyecon/transmission_forum/CEE_Texas_RPS_Study.pdf.   
27. Chao, H. (2009). An Economic Framework of Demand Response in Restructured Electricity 
Markets. Market monitoring Unit ISO England. Retrieved from  
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/2009/Demand%20Response%20in%20Restructured
%20Markets%2002-08-09.pdf  
28. Chiradeja, P., Ramakumar, R. (2004). An Approach to Quantify the Technical Benefits of 
  90 
Distributed Generation. IEEE Transactions on Energy Conversion, 19(4), 764-774. 
29. Cooke, D. (2011). Empowering Customer Choice in Electricity Markets (Information Paper). 
International Energy Agency.   
30. Cory, K., Coughlin, J. Jenkin, T., Pater, J., Swezey, B. (2008). Innovations in Wind and solar 
PV Financing (Technical Report). National Renewable Energy Laboratory. Retrieved 
December 20, 2014, http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy08osti/42919.pdf. 
31. Costello, K.W., Hemphill, R.C. (2014). Electric Utilities’ ‘Death Spiral’: Hyperbole or 
Reality? The Electricity Journal, 27(10), 7-27. 
32. Cox, M, Peichl, A. Pestel, N., Siegloch, S. (2013). Labor Demand Effects of Rising Electricity 
Prices: Evidence for Germany (IZA Policy Paper No. 74). Retrieved March 23, 2015, 
http://ftp.iza.org/pp74.pdf. 
33. Crago, C.L., Chernyakhovskiy, I. (2014). Solar PV Technology Adoption in the United States: 
An Empirical Investigation of State Policy Effectiveness. USAEE Online Proceedings.   
34. Craig, D. J., Savage, S.J. (2013). Market Restructuring, Competition and the Efficiency of 
Electricity Generation: Plant-level Evidence from the United States 1996 to 2006. The Energy 
Journal, 34(1), 1-32.   
35. Darghouth, N.R., Barbose, G., Wiser, R. (2014). Customer-Economics of Residential 
Economics of Residential Photovoltaic Systems (Part 1): The Impact of High Renewable 
Energy Penetrations on Electricity Bill Savings With Net Metering. Journal of Energy Policy, 
67(2014), 290-300.  
36. Darghouth, N.R., Barbose; G., Wiser, R. (2012). The Potential Impact of Increased 
Renewable Energy Penetration Levels on Electricity Bill Savings from Residential 
Photovoltaic Systems (Technical Report). Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 
Environmental Energy Technologies Division. Retrieved March 8, 2015, 
http://emp.lbl.gov/publications/potential-impact-increased-renewable-energy-penetration-
  91 
levels-electricity-bill-savings.  
37. Department of Energy Federal Electricity Regulatory Commission. (2012). Assessment of 
Demand Response and Advanced Metering (Staff Report). Retrieved January 8, 2014 from 
http://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/12-20-12-demand-response.pdf. 
38. Dismukes, D.E. (2012). Removing Big Wind’s Training Wheels: The Case of Ending the 
Federal Production Tax Credit (Research Report for American Energy Alliance). Center for 
Energy Studies at Louisiana State University. Retrieved February 18, 2014, 
http://www.americanenergyalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Dismukes-Removing-
Big-Winds-Training-Wheels.pdf.  
39. Dixit, A.K & Pindyck, R.S. (1993). Investment under Uncertainty, first ed. Princeton 
University Press. New Jersey. 
40. Dubin, J.A., MacFadden, D.L. (1984). An Econometric Analysis of Residential Electric 
Appliance Holdings and Consumption. Econometrica, 52(2), 345-362.  
41. Earle, R., Newell, S., Faruqui, A., Hajos, A., Hledik, R. (2008). Fostering Economic Demand 
Response in the Midwest ISO (Report). The Brattle Group. Retrieved from 
http://www.brattle.com/system/publications/pdfs/000/004/725/original/Fostering_Economic_
DR_in_MISO_Earle_et_al__Dec_2008.pdf?1378772125.  
42. Eid, C., Guillen, J.R., Marin, P.F., Hakvoort, R. (2014). The Economic Effect of Electricity 
Net-Metering With Solar PV: Consequences for Network Cost Recovery, Cross Subsidies and 
Policy Objectives. Journal of Energy Policy, 75(2014), 244-254.  
43. Elkhaifif, M.A. T. (1992). Estimating Disaggregated Price Elasticities in Industrial Energy 
Demand. The Energy Journal, 13(4), 209-217.  
44. Energy Star. (2014). Improvements in Industrial Energy Performance. Retrieved September 
19, 2014, from http://www.energystar.gov/buildings/facility-owners-and-managers/industrial-
plants/market-impacts-improvements-industrial-sector-0. 
  92 
45. ERCOT. (2006). Annual Report on the Texas Renewable Energy Credit Trading Program 
(Market Report). Retrieved from 
https://www.texasrenewables.com/staticReports/Annual%20Report/2006_Report.pdf 
46. ERCOT. (2012). Annual Report on the Texas Renewable Energy Credit Trading Program 
(Market Report). Retrieved from 
https://www.texasrenewables.com/staticReports/Annual%20Report/2012%20ERCOT%20An
nual%20REC%20Report.pdf 
47. Erdogdu, E. (2010). Natural Gas Demand in Turkey. Journal of Applied Energy, 87(1), 211-
219. 
48. Fan, S., Hyndman, R.J. (2011). The Price Elasticity of Electricity Demand in South Australia. 
Journal of Energy Policy, 39(6), 3709-3719.  
49. Faruqui, A., Hledik, R., Tsoukalis, J. (2009). The Power of Dynamic Pricing. The Electricity 
Journal, 22(3), 42-56. 
50. Faruqui, A. (2010). The Ethics of Dynamic Pricing. The Electricity Journal, 23(6), 13-27.   
51. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. (2014). Assessment of Advanced Metering and 
Demand Response (Staff Report). Retrieved from March 24, 2015 
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/demand-response/dem-res-adv-
metering.asp.  
52. Fell, H., Linn, J., Munnings, C. (2012). Designing Renewable Electricity Policies to Reduce 
Emissions. Resources for the Future (Discussion Paper). Washington DC. Retrieved March 8, 
2012, http://www.rff.org/Publications/Pages/PublicationDetails.aspx?PublicationID=22118. 
53. Fuss, S., Szolgyaova, J., Obersteiner, M. Gusti, M. (2008). Investment Under Market and 
Climate Policy Uncertainty. Journal of Applied Energy, 85(2008), 708-721. 
54. Fuss, S., Szolgyaova, J., Khabarov, N., Obersteiner, M. (2012). Renewables and Climate 
Change Mitigation: Irreversible Energy Investment Under Uncertainty and Portfolio Effects. 
  93 
Journal of Energy Policy, 40(2012), 59-68. 
55. Fuss, S., Szolgyaova, J. (2010). Fuel Price and Technological Uncertainty in Real Options 
Model for Electricity Planning. Journal of Applied Energy, 87, 2938-2944.  
56. Gately, D., Huntington, H.G. (2002). The Asymmetric Effects of Changes in Price and 
Income on Energy and Oil Demand. The Energy Journal, 23(1), 19-55.  
57. Gillingham, K., Newell, R., Palmer, K. (2006). Energy Efficiency Policies: A Retrospective 
Examination. Annual Review of Environmental Resources, 32, 161-192.   
58. Goldman, C., Hopper, N., Bharvirkar, R., Neenen, B., Capper, P. (2007). Estimating Demand 
Response Market Potential among Large Commercial and Industrial Customers: A Scoping 
Study (Technical Report). Ernest Orlando Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. 
59. Heeter, J., Armstrong, P., Bird, L. (2012). Market Brief: Status of the Voluntary Renewable 
Energy Certificate Market (2011 Data) (Technical Report). National Renewable Energy 
Laboratory. Retrieved February 2, 2013, 
http://www.windpoweringamerica.gov/filter_detail.asp?itemid=3707.  
60. Heeter J., Bird, L. (2011). Status and Trends in US Compliance and Voluntary Renewable 
Energy Certificate Markets, 2010 Data (Technical Report). National Renewable Energy 
Laboratory. Retrieved January 24, 2013, www.nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/52925.pd.  
61. Houthakker H.S. (1974). Dynamic Demand Analyses for Gasoline and Residential Electricity. 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 56, 412-418.  
62. Hyde, D., Komor, P. (2014). Distributed PV and Securitization: Made for Each Other? The 
Electricity Journal, 27(5), 63-70.    
63. ICF International. (2010). Photovoltaic (PV) Cost and Performance Characteristics for 
Residential and Commercial Applications (Technical Report for Energy Information 
Administration). Office of Integrated Analysis and Forecasting. 
Retrieved from http://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/distribgen/system/pdf/full.pdf  
  94 
64. ISO New England. (2012). 2012 Wholesale Electricity Prices in New England Fell to Lowest 
Level Since 2003: Lower natural Gas Prices and Lower Demand Combine to Push Electricity 
Prices Down to a 10 Year-Low. Retrieved April 1, 2014 from, http://www.iso-
ne.com/nwsiss/pr/2013/2012_prices_final_01232013.pdf.  
65. Jannson, P.M., Michaelfelder, R.A. (2008). Integrating Renewables into the U.S. Grid: Is it 
Sustainable? The Electricity Journal, 21(6), 9-21. 
66. KEMA Consulting. (2005). Industrial Case Study: Cement Industry (CALMAC Study ID: 
PGE0251.01). Retrieved March 23, 2015 from, 
http://www.calmac.org/publications/industrialcementfinalkema.pdf. 
67. Kind, P. (2013). Disruptive Challenges: Financial Implications and Strategic Responses to a 
Changing Retail Electric Businesses (Technical Report). Edison Electric Institute. Retrieved 
from March 9, 2015, 
http://www.eei.org/ourissues/finance/documents/disruptivechallenges.pdf.  
68. Kirschen, D.S. (2003). Demand-Side View of Electricity Markets. IEEE Transactions on 
Power Systems, 18(2), 520-527. 
69. Labandeira, X, Labeage, J.M., Lopez-Otero, X. (2010). Estimation of Elasticity Price of 
Electricity with Incomplete Information. Journal of Energy Economics, 34(3), 627-633. 
70. Lantz, E., Steinber, D., Mendhelson, M., Zinaman, O., James, T., Porro, G., Hand, M., Mai, 
T., Logan, J., Heeter, J., Bird, L. (2014). Implications of a PTC Extension on US Wind 
Deployment (Technical Report). National Renewable Energy Laboratory. Retrieved 
November 8, 2014 from http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy14osti/61663.pdf.  
71. Lijesen, M.G. (2007). The Real-Time Price of Electricity. Journal of Energy Economics, 
29(2), 249-258.  
  95 
72. Linn, J., Richardson, N. (2013). Cutting Carbon, Take Two: A Brief Guide to Federal 
Electricity-Sector Climate Policy Without Cap-and-Trade. Applied Economic Perspectives 
and Policy, 35(3), 377-397.  
73. Liu, G. (2004). Estimating Energy Demand Elasticities for OECD Countries: A Dynamic 
Panel Data Approach (Discussion Papers No. 373). Statistics Norway, Research Department.  
74. Lou, C. (2011). Generation Portfolio Optimization under Wind Production Tax Credit and 
Renewable Portfolio Standard. Graduate Theses and Dissertations, Iowa State University. 
Available at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd/11202/. (Paper 11202).  
75. Loughran, D.D., Kulick, J. (2004). Demand-Side Management and Energy Efficiency in the 
United States. The Energy Journal, 25(1), 19-43.  
76. Lu, X., Tchou, J., McElroy, M. B., Nielsen, C. P. (2011). The Impact of Production Tax 
Credits on the Profitable Production of Electricity from Wind in the U.S. Journal of Energy 
Policy, 39(7), 4207-4214.  
77. Maddala, G.S., Trost, R.P., Li, H., Joutz, F.  (1997). Estimation of Short-Run and Long-Run 
Elasticities of Energy Demand from Panel Using Shrinkage Estimators. Journal of Business 
and Economic Statistics, 15(1), 90-101.   
78. Marex Spectron. (2014). Renewable Electricity Credits Daily Spot Prices between May 2006 
and November 2012. Level Five, 155 Bishopsgate. London EC2M 3TQ. Retrieved from 
http://www.marexspectron.com/Commodities/Energy/Electricity.aspx 
79. Martinot, E., Wiser, R., Hamrin, J. (2005). Renewable Energy Policies and Markets in the 
United States. Center for Resources Solutions of San Francisco. 
80. Midwest ISO. (2012). Demand Response in MISO Markets (Presentation in NASUCA Panel 
on DR).  
81. Midwestern Regional Climate Center. (2014). Cli-MATE MRCC Application Tools 
Environment (Database). Retrieved from  http://mrcc.isws.illinois.edu/ 
  96 
82. Miranda, M.J., & Fackler, P.L. (2002). Applied Computational Economics and Finance, first 
ed. The MIT Press, Cambridge. 
83. Morse, J. (1997). Regulatory Policy Regarding Distributed Generation by Utilities: The Impact 
of Restructuring. The Energy Journal, 18 (Special Issue:  Distributed Resources: Toward a 
NewParadigm of the Electricity Business), 187-210.  
84. Mosino, A. (2012). Producing Energy in a Stochastic Environment: Switching from Non-
Renewable to Renewable Sources. Journal of Resource and Energy Economics, 34(4), 413-
430. 
85. Newell, S., Hajos, A. (2010). Demand Response in the Midwest ISO: An Evaluation of 
Wholesale Market Design (Report for Midwest Independent System Operator). The Brattle 
Group. Retrieved from 
http://www.brattle.com/system/publications/pdfs/000/004/705/original/Demand_Response_in
_the_Midwest_ISO_Newell_Hajos_Jan_29_2010.pdf?1378772122  
86. Palmer, K., Burtraw, D. (2005). Cost-Effectiveness of Renewable Electricity Policies. Journal 
of Energy Economics, 27(6), 873-894. 
87. Patrick, R.H., Wolak, F.A. (2011). Estimating the Customer-Level Demand for Electricity 
under Real-Time Prices (NBER Working Paper Series). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of 
Economic Research.  
88. Pepermans, G., Diresen, J., Haeseldonckx, D., Belmans, R., D’haeseleer, W. (2005). 
Distributed Generation: Definition, Benefits and Issues. Journal of Energy Policy, 33(6), 787-
798.  
89. Pfienberger, J., Hajos, A. (2011). Demand Response Review (Presentation to AESO). 
90. Pielow, A, Sioshansi, R., Roberts, M.C. (2012). Modelling Short-Run Electricity Demand 
with Long-Term Growth Rates and Consumer Price Elasticity in Commercial and Industrial 
Sectors. Journal of Energy, 46(1), 533-540.  
  97 
91. Pindyck, R.S. (1980). Uncertainty and Exhaustible Resource Markets. The Journal of 
Political Economy, 88 (6), 1203-1225. 
92. Pindyck, R.S. (1984). Uncertainty in the Theory of Renewable Resource Markets. The Review 
of Economic Studies, 51(2), 289-303. 
93. Pindyck, R.S. (1988). Irreversible Investment, Capacity Choice, and the Value of the Firm. 
The American Economic Review, 78 (5), 969-985. 
94. Pindyck, R.S. (2000). Irreversibilities and The Timing of Environmental Policy. Resource 
and Energy Economics, 22(3), 233-259. 
95. PJM Interconnection. (2012). PJM’s Response to the 2012 State of the Market Report. 
Retrieved April 1, 2014 from http://www.pjm.com/~/media/documents/reports/20130510-
pjm-response-to-the-2012-state-of-the-market-report.ashx.  
96. Potomac Economics. (2012). 2012 State of the Market Report for the ERCOT Wholesale 
Electricity Markets. Independent Market Monitor for the ERCOT Wholesale Market. 
Retrieved April 1, 2014, 
http://www.potomaceconomics.com/uploads/ercot_reports/2012_ERCOT_SOM_REPORT.p
df.  
97. Raskin, D. (2014). The Regulatory Challenge of Distributed Generation. Harvard Business 
Law Review Online. Retrieved from http://www.hblr.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/Raskin_The-Regulatory-Challenge-Of-Distributed-Generation.pdf. 
98. Reuter, W.H., Szolgayova, J., Fuss, S., Obersteiner, M. (2012). Renewable Energy 
Investment: Policy and Market Impacts. Journal of Applied Energy, 97, 249-254.  
99. Reuter, W.H., Fuss, S., Szolgayova, J., Obersteiner, M. (2012). Investment in Wind Power 
and Pumped Storage in a Real Options Model. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 
16(4), 2242-2248.  
  98 
100. Schwarz, P.M., Taylor, T.N. (2002). Industrial Response to Electricity Real-Time Prices: 
Short Run and Long Run. Journal of Economic Inquiry, 40(4), 597-610.  
101. Sener, C., Fthenakis, V. (2014). Energy Policy and Financing Options to Achieve Solar 
Energy Grid Penetration Targets: Accounting for External Costs. Renewable and Sustainable 
Energy Reviews, 32, 854-868. 
102. Shehata, E.A.E. (2011). LMHREG3: Stata Module to Compute Overall System 
Heteroscedasticity Tests After (3SLS-SURE) Regressions.  Retrieved from  
http://fmwww.bc.edu/repec/bocode/l/lmhreg3.sthlp 
103. Shehata, E.A.E. (2012). LMCOVREG3: Stata Module to Compute Breusch-Pagan Lagrange 
Multiplier Diagonal Covariance Matrix Test after (3SLS-SURE) Regressions. Retrieved from 
https://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s457411.html 
104. Sherman, A. (2013). Wind Power and the Production Tax Credits. IBISWorld. Retrieved 
from: http://www.ibisworld.com/media/2013/06/06/wind-power-and-the-production-tax-
credit/.  
105. Sioshansi, F., Vojdani, A. (2001). What Could Possibly Be Better than Real-Time Pricing? 
Demand Response. The Electricity Journal, 14(5), 39-50.  
106. Solar Energy Industry Association. (2014a). Net Metering by State. Retrieved from 
http://www.seia.org/research-resources/solar-market-insight-report-2014-q1.  
107. Solar Energy Industry Association, (2014b). Solar Market Insight Report 2014 Q1. Retrieved 
from http://www.seia.org/research-resources/net-metering-state. 
108. Solar Energy Industry Association (2013a). U.S. Solar MARKET Insight 2013 Q1. Retrieved 
from http://www.seia.org/research-resources/us-solar-market-insight-2013-q1. 
109. Spees, K., Lave, L.B. (2007). Demand Response and Electricity Market Efficiency. The 
Electricity Journal, 20(3), 69-85.  
  99 
110. Spratley, W.A., (1998). Solar Rooftops as Distributed Resources. The Electricity Journal, 
11(10), 40-50.  
111. SRECTrade. (2014). SREC Markets: SREC Facts. Retrieved from 
http://www.srectrade.com/srec_markets/  
112. Stanton, T. (2013). State and Utility Solar Energy Programs: Recommended Approaches for 
Growing Markets. Report by National Regulatory Research Institute with Daniel Phelan. 
(Report number 13-07).  
Retrieved from http://michigan.gov/documents/mpsc/stantonnrri_448504_7.pdf.  
113. StataCorp. (2013). Stata Statistical Software: Release 13. College Station, TX: StataCorp 
LP. 
114. Tegen, S., Hand, M., Maples, B., Lantz, E., Schwabe, P., Smith, A. (2013). 2011 Cost of 
Wind Energy Review (Technical Report). National Renewable Energy Laboratory. Retrieved 
October 23, 2012, www.nrel.gov/docs/fy13osti/56266.pdf.  
115. The Brattle Group. (2009). Review of the Demand Response Integration in the Midwest ISO. 
(Presentation to MISO).  
116. The World Bank. (2013). Data: GDP Deflator by Country. Retrieved from 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS.   
117. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration. (2013). Retrieved 
December 17, 2013, http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=6730.  
118.  US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration 2014. AEO2014 Early 
Release Overview: Delivered Energy by Sector. 
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/early_consumption.cfm Accessed on September 19, 
2014.  
119.  U.S. Department of Energy. (2007). Benefits of Demand Response in Electricity Markets 
and Recommendations for Achieving Them. A Report in the United States Congress Pursuant 
  100 
to Section 1252 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005. Retrieved from 
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/DOE_Benefits_of_Demand_R
esponse_in_Electricity_Markets_and_Recommendations_for_Achieving_Them_Report_to_C
ongress.pdf  
120. U.S. Department of Energy. (2013). 2013 Renewable Energy Data Book (NREL Research 
Reports). National Renewable Energy Laboratory. Retrieved March 3, 2015, 
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy15osti/62580.pdf  
121. U.S. Department of Energy. (2013). Current RPS Data and Production Tax Credits 
Incentives. Database for State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE). Retrieved 
January 31, 2013, http://www.dsireusa.org/rpsdata/index.cfm. 
122. U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2010). Status of Electricity Restructuring by State. 
Retrieved from http://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/restructuring/restructure_elect.html  
123. U.S. Department of Energy. (2012). The Green Power Network: Green Power Markets, 
Renewable Electricity Certificates (RECs). Retrieved June 23, 2013, 
http://apps3.eere.energy.gov/greenpower/markets/certificates.shtml?page=0. 
124. U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2012). Today in Energy: U.S. Wind Generation 
Increased 27% in 2011. Retrieved December 24, 2012, 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=5350 .  
125. U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2012). Today in Energy: U.S. Wind Industry 
installs almost 5300MW of capacity in December. Retrieved December 24, 2012, 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=9931. 
126. U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2014). Annual Energy Outlook: Market Trends and 
Electricity Demand 2014 (Report Number: DOE/EIA-0383ER(2014). Retrieved March 30, 
2015, http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/MT_electric.cfm.  
  101 
127. U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2013). Wind Industry Installs Almost 5300 MW of 
Capacity in December. Retrieved February 14, 2014, 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=9931.  
128. U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2014). Short-Term Energy Outlook and Summer 
Fuels Outlook. Retrieved April 14, 2014, 
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/report/renew_co2.cfm.  
129. U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2014d). Electricity Form EIA 923 Reports with 
Previous Form Data (EIA-906/920, Data released on April 30, 2015). Retrieved from 
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia923/ 
130. U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2014). Wholesale Market Data. Retrieved March 
14, 2014,  http://www.eia.gov/electricity/wholesale/   
131. Vahl, F.P., Rüther, R., Filho, N.C. (2013). The Influence of Distributed Generation 
Penetration Levels on Energy Markets. Journal of Energy Policy, 62(2013), 226-235. 
132. Veldman, E., Gibescu, M., Slootweg, H. J.G., Kling, W. L. (2013). Scenario-based 
modelling of future residential electricity demands and assessing their impact on distribution 
grids. Journal of Energy Policy, 56 (2013), 233-247.  
133. Wiser, R., Nomovicz, C., Gilecki, M., Smith, R. (2007). Renewable Portfolio Standards: A 
Factual Introduction to Experience from the United States (Technical Report). Lawrence 
Berkeley National Laboratory. Retrieved February 7, 2015, 
http://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/lbnl%20-%2062569.pdf.  
134. Wiser, R. (2007). Wind Power and Production Tax Credit: An Overview of Research Results 
(Technical Report). Lawrence Berkley National Laboratory. Retrieved December 23, 2012, 
http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ems/. 
135. Wiser, R., Bolinger, M. (2012). Wind Technologies Market Report. Department of Energy, 
Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, August 2013. Retrieved February 7, 2014, 
  102 
http://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/lbnl-6356e.pdf.    
136. World Resources Institute. (2010). The Bottom Line on Renewable Energy Tax Credits. 
Retrieved April 2, 2014, 
http://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/pdf/bottom_line_renewable_energy_tax_credits_10-
2010.pdf  
137. Wiginton, L.K., Nguyen, H.T., Pearce, J.M. (2010). Quantifying Rooftop Solar Photovoltaic 
Potential for Regional Renewable Energy Policy. Journal of Computers, Environment and 
Urban Systems, 34(4), 345-357.    
138. Walawalkar, R., Fernands, S., Thakur, N., Chevva, K. R. (2010). Evolution and Current 
Status of Demand Response (DR) in Electricity Markets: Insights from PJM and NYISO. 
Journal of Energy, 35(4), 1553-1560.  
139. Wiser, R., Bolinger, M., Barbose, G. (2007). Using the Production Tax Credits to Build a 
Durable Market for Wind Power in the United States. The Electricity Journal, 20(9), 77-88.  
140. Wooldridge, J.M. (2010). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, second 
ed. MIT Press.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  103 
6. Appendix  
 
 
Appendix Figure 1. 1 
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Appendix Figure 3. 1: Share of Coal and Natural Gas in Total Generation Mix 
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 Appendix Figure 3. 2: PV installations between 2008 and 2012 
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 Appendix Figure 3. 3: Monthly Average Residential Electricity Prices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8
9
1
0
1
1
1
2
1
3
P
ri
c
e
 (
c
e
n
ts
/k
W
h
)
Jan2000 Jan2002 Jan2004 Jan2006 Jan2008 Jan2010 Jan2012
Month-Year
Un-Restructured Restructured Suspended
Source: Energy Information Administration, 2013
Monthly Average Residential Electricity Prices Between 2000-2012
  107 
Appendix Table 1. 1: OLS Regression Output for Calibration 
 REC Price 
L.REC Price  0.994*** 
 (326.14) 
Constant  0.3709* 
 (1.91) 
N 1562 
R-sq 0.99 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.1    ** p<0.05   *** p<0.01 
 
Appendix Table 2. 1: Dynamic Pricing Programs in the MISO States in 2013 
State TOU CPP RTP 
IA X X X 
IL X  X 
IN X X X 
KY X  X 
MI X X X 
MN X X  
MO X   
MT X   
ND X X  
NE X X  
OH X X X 
SD X   
WI X X X 
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Appendix Table 2. 2: Validity of the Instruments for the Retail Market Model 
 Retail IV 
Hansen-Sargan (1982) statistic 0.852 
(0.356) 
Partial F-stat (1st stage) 89.02 
(0.0001) 
Cragg-Donald Wald 184.842 
(19.93 (10% maximal IV size17)) 
(11.59 (15% maximal IV size)) 
 (8.75   (20% maximal IV size)) 
P-values in parenthesis  
 
 
Appendix Table 2. 3: Validity of the Instruments for the Wholesale Market Model 
 Wholesale IV 
Hansen-Sargan (1982) statistic  0.025  
(0.8747) 
Partial F-stat (1st stage) 34.86 
(0.0001) 
Cragg-Donald Wald  176.528 
(19.93 (10% maximal IV size)) 
(11.59 (15% maximal IV size)) 
 (8.75   (20% maximal IV size)) 
P-values in parenthesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 Maximal IV size represents the tolerable bias level based on the two-stage IV estimation. Partial F-
statistic and Cragg-Donald statistics should be greater than the tolerable bias levels in order to reject the 
null hypothesis of endogenous regressors are unidentified.   
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Appendix Table 2. 4: Results from Industrial Demand: OLS and IV Estimations 
  OLS IV-1 IV-2 
log_real_IndPrice -0.089 -0.109 -0.169 
 (-1.04) (-1.05) (-1.52) 
L.lnindsalespercustomer 0.922*** 0.548*** 0.574*** 
 (24.23) (3.56) (3.81) 
log_ManEmployment 0.086** -0.592* -0.656** 
 (2.03) (-1.87) (-2.05) 
log_real_ng 0.017 0.140 0.156 
 (0.12) (1.07) (1.14) 
log_sLMPPIA -0.022** -0.019**  
 (-2.36) (-2.33)  
log_tempreture -0.024 0.190 0.208 
 (-0.06) (0.24) (0.25) 
inter_iowa -0.027 -0.162 -0.140 
 (-0.67) (-1.65) (-1.49) 
inter_illinois -0.028 -0.127 -0.113 
 (-0.56) (-0.74) (-0.65) 
inter_indiana -0.048 -0.130 -0.107 
 (-0.95) (-1.21) (-0.98) 
inter_kentucky -0.050 -0.165* -0.066 
 (-0.61) (-1.75) (-0.55) 
inter_michigan -0.086** -0.314** -0.332** 
 (-2.12) (-2.35) (-2.52) 
inter_minnesota -0.055 -0.247* -0.225* 
 (-1.26) (-1.91) (-1.75) 
inter_montana -0.124 0.032  
 (-1.63) (0.34)  
inter_missouri -0.118* -0.190** -0.176** 
 (-1.85) (-2.09) (-2.07) 
inter_n_dakota 0.012 -0.108 -0.087 
 (0.17) (-1.22) (-0.93) 
inter_nebraska -0.146 -0.102 -0.071 
 (-1.62) (-0.94) (-0.67) 
inter_ohio -0.065 -0.186 -0.170 
 (-1.25) (-1.64) (-1.52) 
inter_s_dakota -0.007 -0.052 -0.023 
 (-0.11) (-0.55) (-0.24) 
dum_2001 0.110* 0.240*** 0.239*** 
 (1.88) (3.30) (3.29) 
dum_2002 0.130*** 0.266*** 0.255*** 
 (3.20) (3.70) (3.65) 
dum_2003 -0.073 0.011 -0.003 
 (-0.79) (0.15) (-0.04) 
dum_2005 0.110 0.050 0.048 
 (1.32) (0.86) (0.83) 
dum_2007 0.079** 0.075* 0.073* 
 (2.06) (1.89) (1.81) 
dum_2008 0.175** 0.152* 0.159* 
 (2.16) (1.97) (1.69) 
dum_2009 0.141 0.090 0.119 
 (1.25) (0.85) (0.94) 
dum_2010 0.256*** 0.157** 0.196** 
  110 
 (3.89) (2.33) (2.28) 
dum_2011 0.129*** 0.091* 0.094 
 (3.13) (1.68) (1.60) 
dum_2012 0.058 0.056 0.072 
 (1.07) (0.70) (0.86) 
log_sLMAPIA   -0.019* 
   (-1.67) 
Constant 0.417   
 (0.28)   
R-sq 0.974 0.638 0.637 
t statistics in parentheses  * p<0.1   ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 
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Appendix Table 2. 5: Peak Demand Events in MISO 2008 and 2013 
Day Month Year Hour 
27 6 2013 15:00 
18 7 2013 16:00 
29 8 2013 16:00 
10 9 2013 16:00 
28 6 2012 17:00 
23 7 2012 16:00 
3 8 2012 16:00 
12 1 2012 19:00 
4 9 2012 17:00 
7 6 2011 17:00 
20 7 2011 17:00 
2 8 2011 16:00 
1 9 2011 16:00 
6 12 2011 19:00 
22 6 2010 17:00 
13 12 2010 19:00 
23 7 2010 16:00 
10 8 2010 16:00 
1 9 2010 16:00 
25 6 2009 15:00 
10 7 2009 16:00 
10 8 2009 15:00 
14 9 2009 16:00 
15 1 2009 20:00 
10 12 2009 19:00 
26 6 2008 15:00 
29 7 2008 17:00 
1 8 2008 16:00 
2 9 2008 16:00 
24 1 2008 20:00 
Source: Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) Market Reports Archive  
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Appendix Table 2. 6: First Stage Regression Results 
  
Robust 
Std. Err. 
    
log_real_IndPrice Coef. t P>t 
[95% 
Conf. Interval] 
L1.lnindsalespercustomer 0.064562 0.02342 2.76 0.007 0.018159 0.110965 
log_ManEmployment -0.73702 0.122642 -6.01 0.000 -0.98002 -0.49402 
log_real_ng 0.220892 0.055542 3.98 0.000 0.110842 0.330942 
log_sLMAPIA -0.01549 0.005173 -3 0.003 -0.02574 -0.00524 
log_tempreture 0.831637 0.423829 1.96 0.052 -0.00813 1.671401 
inter_iowa 0.125632 0.05201 2.42 0.017 0.022581 0.228683 
inter_illinois 0.110147 0.052145 2.11 0.037 0.006828 0.213465 
inter_indiana 0.118647 0.052303 2.27 0.025 0.015016 0.222278 
inter_kentucky 0.24229 0.062493 3.88 0.000 0.118469 0.366112 
inter_michigan 0.049773 0.060166 0.83 0.41 -0.06944 0.168985 
inter_minnesota 0.161626 0.047441 3.41 0.001 0.067628 0.255624 
inter_missouri 0.045117 0.05215 0.87 0.389 -0.05821 0.148446 
inter_n_dakota -0.03788 0.072349 -0.52 0.602 -0.18123 0.105471 
inter_nebraska 0.156556 0.049639 3.15 0.002 0.058202 0.25491 
inter_ohio 0.109199 0.049004 2.23 0.028 0.012103 0.206294 
inter_s_dakota 0.166372 0.049725 3.35 0.001 0.067849 0.264895 
dum_2001 0.335161 0.038195 8.77 0.000 0.259482 0.41084 
dum_2002 0.584028 0.046583 12.54 0.000 0.491729 0.676327 
dum_2003 0.052637 0.034715 1.52 0.132 -0.01615 0.121421 
dum_2005 -0.06976 0.017756 -3.93 0.000 -0.10494 -0.03458 
dum_2007 0.086922 0.023647 3.68 0.000 0.040067 0.133776 
dum_2008 0.254025 0.041714 6.09 0.000 0.171374 0.336676 
dum_2009 0.647829 0.06454 10.04 0.000 0.519951 0.775708 
dum_2010 -0.18347 0.066188 -2.77 0.007 -0.31462 -0.05233 
dum_2011 -0.36642 0.045008 -8.14 0.000 -0.45559 -0.27724 
dum_2012 -0.07702 0.039926 -1.93 0.056 -0.15613 0.002091 
log_GDPNOutil 1.021441 0.123741 8.25 0.000 0.776265 1.266618 
L1.log_real_IndPrice 0.545597 0.057891 9.42 0.000 0.430894 0.6603 
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Appendix Table 2. 7: Real-Time Market Estimations for MISO 
  All Day On-Peak (8am-22pm) On-Peak (3pm-8pm) Off-Peak DR Event 
lnMISOSystem -0.131*** -0.294*** -0.207*** -0.082* -0.101*** 
 (-8.97) (-10.54) (-6.36) (-1.92) (-5.09) 
L.lnactualloadmwh 0.973***     
 (497.62)     
TG -0.002* -0.002 -0.002  -0.006*** 
 (-1.66) (-1.46) (-0.87)  (-3.09) 
LWY -0.001 -0.006*** -0.005**  0.001 
 (-0.95) (-4.28) (-2.55)  (0.42) 
trend -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.62) (0.06) (0.36) (0.52) (-1.12) 
Pricesq 0.020*** 0.040*** 0.029*** 0.011** 0.019*** 
 (9.73) (10.87) (6.83) (2.14) (5.56) 
hourpeak 0.033***   0.035***  
 (40.99)   (7.59)  
interMAXtemp -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000**   
 (-3.02) (-4.62) (-2.29)   
interMINtemp -0.000*** -0.000***   -0.000*** 
 (-4.46) (-3.91)   (-5.10) 
PEAKinter -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000  
 (-5.51) (-5.60) (-3.86) (-1.28)  
hour2 0.026***   0.019*** 0.031*** 
 (29.52)   (3.81) (50.36) 
hour3 0.037***   0.033*** 0.044*** 
 (38.87)   (6.94) (63.58) 
hour4 0.052***   0.051*** 0.060*** 
 (59.76)   (10.08) (87.86) 
hour5 0.076***   0.082*** 0.082*** 
 (81.61)   (15.85) (111.66) 
hour6 0.107***   0.117*** 0.108*** 
 (97.61)   (19.66) (112.08) 
hour7 0.125***   0.136*** 0.121*** 
 (123.63)   (25.95) (115.95) 
hour8 0.086*** 0.088***  0.105***  
 (121.41) (74.02)  (19.78)  
hour9 0.067*** 0.071***  0.091***  
 (98.66) (65.75)  (16.43)  
hour10 0.055*** 0.060***  0.084***  
 (80.13) (56.66)  (13.77)  
hour11 0.048*** 0.054***  0.078***  
 (74.93) (51.38)  (14.13)  
hour12 0.041*** 0.047***  0.073***  
 (66.97) (45.11)  (14.55)  
hour13 0.036*** 0.041***  0.064***  
 (61.75) (41.46)  (13.08)  
hour14 0.033*** 0.038***  0.056***  
 (59.06) (38.78)  (12.29)  
hour15 0.029*** 0.032*** -0.007*** 0.049***  
 (52.02) (31.66) (-9.28) (11.86)  
hour16 0.029*** 0.031*** -0.007*** 0.041***  
 (54.22) (33.86) (-10.16) (9.47)  
hour17 0.033*** 0.036*** -0.002*** 0.039***  
 (63.36) (39.62) (-3.73) (10.33)  
hour18 0.041*** 0.046*** 0.006*** 0.039***  
 (58.90) (38.32) (8.30) (7.14)  
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hour19 0.044*** 0.049*** 0.009*** 0.030***  
 (58.63) (43.66) (12.68) (5.17)  
hour20 0.034*** 0.040***  0.021***  
 (51.14) (36.87)  (4.91)  
hour21 0.024*** 0.028***  0.021***  
 (41.13) (30.16)  (5.79)  
hour23 0.007***    0.003*** 
 (8.77)    (4.63) 
jan -0.001* 0.010*** 0.010***  0.001 
 (-1.75) (15.24) (10.37)  (1.55) 
feb 0.004*** 0.001** 0.018***  0.006*** 
 (7.17) (1.99) (17.33)  (7.24) 
mar -0.005***    0.006*** 
 (-9.93)    (5.37) 
apr -0.001** -0.007*** 0.002**  0.013*** 
 (-2.20) (-11.11) (2.32)  (11.95) 
jun -0.002*** -0.005*** -0.002*  0.000 
 (-3.66) (-6.27) (-1.73)  (0.18) 
jul -0.001 0.001*   -0.004*** 
 (-1.12) (1.82)   (-4.90) 
sep -0.002*** -0.001   -0.000 
 (-2.79) (-1.48)   (-0.39) 
oct -0.002*** -0.006*** 0.005***  0.006*** 
 (-3.71) (-6.70) (4.67)  (6.27) 
summer 0.005*** 0.011*** 0.002*   
 (7.47) (14.05) (1.89)   
winter 0.006*** -0.006*** 0.011***  0.005*** 
 (9.64) (-8.88) (10.37)  (6.44) 
fall 0.002*** 0.000 0.007***  0.009*** 
 (3.92) (0.23) (6.57)  (11.53) 
laglnactualloadmwh  0.978*** 0.973*** 0.971*** 0.992*** 
  (272.11) (220.71) (60.20) (335.83) 
DRevent  0.007*** -0.001   
  (4.95) (-0.31)   
dec  0.013*** 0.013***   
  (19.02) (12.99)   
aug   0.002**   
   (2.01)   
nov   0.010***   
   (10.56)   
may     0.007*** 
     (6.00) 
hour24    -0.008*  
    (-1.68)  
Constant  0.441*** 0.734*** 0.645*** 0.405*** 0.145*** 
 (24.51) (26.87) (19.27) (2.86) (2.82) 
N 48994 32353 13021 660 16641 
R-sq 0.979 0.969 0.979 0.992 0.971 
t statistics in parentheses      
="* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01"    
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Appendix Table 3. 1: NEM Grade Calculation 
Policy Metric Description  Highest Points Lowest Points  
Individual System 
Capacity  
Largest system allowed to 
net metering   
+5 points for 2MW+ -1  
Only residential below 
20kW 
Total Program Capacity 
Limits  
Total Program Limit as 
percentage of peak 
demand  
+2.5 or greater, no limit -0.5 for less than 0.2% 
Restrictions on Rollover Rollover provisions  +1.5 for indefinite rollover 
at retail rate 
-4 for no rollover 
permitted, excess energy 
donated to utility monthly  
Metering Issues Metering Provisions +2 for no meter change 
requirements-customer-
sited generator uses 
existing meter 
-1 for Fixed TOU rate 
disadvantages small 
generators 
REC Renewable Energy Credit 
Ownership  
+1 for Owned by customer -5 for Transferred to 
utility without appropriate 
incentive 
Eligible technologies  Eligible technologies  +1 for Solar, wind and 
other renewable zero-
emission tech. 
0 for excess solar and 
wind  
Eligible Customers Customer class eligibility +2 for no eligible class 
restrictions  
0 for residential only  
Bonus for Aggregate Net 
Metering 
Bonus +1 for A customer may 
aggregate all meters on 
his or her contiguous 
property for purposes of 
net metering 
 
Bonus for Community 
Renewables 
Bonus +1 for A customer may 
receive net metering 
credits for investing in or 
subscribing to a 
renewable energy system 
that may not be physically 
located on their property. 
 
Safe Harbor Provisions, 
standby charges or other 
fees 
Fee treatment +3 for Safe harbor 
language protects 
customers from 
unspecified additional 
equipment, fees, 
requirements to change 
tariffs, etc. 
-5 for per kWh fee on all 
production in addition to 
other fees 
Policy Coverage Utilities Covered +1 for Rules apply to all 
utilities 
0 for rules apply to 
investor-owned utilities 
only  
Third-Party Model Third Party PPA +1 Presumed allowed net 
meter 
-1 Presumed not allowed 
net meter 
Source: Freeing the Grid: Best Practices in State Net Metering Policies and Interconnection Procedures 2010 
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A: Full retail credit with no subtractions. Customers protected from fees and additional charges. 
Rules actively encourage use of DG. 
B: Generally good net metering policies with full retail credit, but there could be certain fees or costs that 
detract from full retail equivalent value. There may be some obstacles to net metering  
C: Adequate net metering rules, but there could be some significant fees or other obstacles that undercut 
the value or make the process of net metering more difficult. 
D: Poor net metering policies with substantial charges or other hindrances. Many customers will forgo an 
opportunity to install DG because net metering rules subtract economic value.  
F: Net metering policies that deter customer-sited DG 
N/A: No state wide policy exist  
 
Appendix Table 3. 2: Literature Review on Price Elasticity of Electricity Demand 
Study by Elasticity Range: 
Residential/Commercial  
Estimation 
Method/Identification Method  
Houthakker et al. (1974); 
Taylor (1975);  Bohi and 
Zimmerman (1984); Dubin and 
MacFadden (1984) 
-[0.2-0.7] Simultaneous Equation Model, 
OLS 
Maddala et al. (1997) Bernstein 
and Griffin (2006) 
-[0.16-0.32] OLS 
Fell, Li and Paul (2010);  
Filippini (2011) 
-[-.82-1.02] 
-[0.7-2.3](on-off peak) 
GMM 
Labendeira (2010) -[0.069-0.2] Tobit 
Halvorsen (1975) -[1.00-1.21] Cost of fuel, average annual 
sales per customer, percentage 
of generation produced by 
publicly owned utilities, cost of 
labor 
Wilder and Wilenborg (1975) -[0.15-0.59] 2SLS as part of the system of 4 
equations  
Hausman, Kinnucan and 
MacFadden (1979) 
-[0.13-0.22] Demand weighted average 
price (they worked out the 
equation) 
Fabrizio, Rose, Wolfram (2007) No price elasticity of demand 
estimation 
Modeled generator efficiency: 
used electricity demand as an 
instrument on the plant output.  
Reiss and White (2005);  -[0.85-1.02] Temperature,  Degree Day, 
Cooling Degree Day, gross 
state product(GSP) 
Alberini and Filippini (2011) 
These guys claim that not 
adding lagged price cause under 
estimation in the price elasticity 
demand for residential sector  
-[0.56-1.03]  Lagged electricity price; 
Alberini and Filippini (2011) 
 
-[0.13-0.7] Fixed effects, Random effects 
and GMM using IV as Lagged 
electricity price 
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Appendix Table 3. 3: State Policy Matrix for Residential Rooftop 
Un-restructured States Restructured States 
NEM 
Grade 
2008 2012 2008 2012 
A CO, FL AZ, CA, CO, VT, 
WV 
MD, NJ, PA CT, DE, MA, MD, 
NJ, NY, OH, PA 
B KY, LA, VT, 
WY, CA, AZ 
FL, HI, IA, IN, 
KS, KY, LA, NE, 
WA, WY 
CT, DE, IL, MA, NY, 
OH, OR, RI 
IL, ME, MI, NH, 
OR, RI 
C HI, IA, MN, MO AK, MN, MO, WI   
D ND, OK, WA, 
WI 
NC, ND   
F GA, IN, NC, 
WV 
GA, OK, SC TX TX 
N/A AK, KS, NE, 
SC, SD 
SD MD, NJ, PA CT, DE, MA, MD, 
NJ, NY, OH, PA 
 
 
Appendix Table 3. 4: Data Sources for Regression Analysis 
Variable Source  
Monthly Residential PV 
Capacity Installations  
Energy Information Administration (EIA) 923 Monthly Reports 
Monthly Utility Electricity 
Sales to Residential Sector 
Energy Information Administration (EIA) 826 Monthly Electricity 
Reports  
Monthly Residential 
Electricity and Natural Gas 
Price 
Energy Information Administration (EIA) 826 Monthly Electricity 
Reports  
Cost of PV OpenPV Project by National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) 
Solar Radiation National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) Solar Radiation 
Database  
State Regulatory Status  Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
Net Energy Metering Grade Solar Energy Industries Associations  
ACEEE Score American Counsel for an Energy Efficient Economy (ACEEE) State 
Energy Efficiency Scorecard   
Temperature  Midwest Regional Climate Center  
Disposable Income Bureau of Economic Analysis  
 
 
 
